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PROFESSIONAL POWER AND THE STANDARD OF
CARE IN MEDICINE
Maxwell J. Mehlman*
INTRODUCTION
Since before the founding of the Republic, American medicine1 has been
fighting a war to control the standard of care that physicians are expected to
provide to their patients. It has waged battles on two fronts: against internal
disagreements within the profession over what constitutes proper care, and
against attempts to delineate the standard of care by forces outside the
profession, such as private health insurers, the government, and the judicial
system.2
*.
The author would like to thank his colleagues at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, particularly Jessica Berg and Cassandra Robertson, and his research assistant,
Kelsey Marand. Research funding for this article was provided by the Robert L. Habush
Foundation of the American Association for Justice. A shorter version of a portion of this article
is forthcoming in the Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics. The author also would like to thank
Ashley Votruba for editorial assistance.
1.
“American medicine” is a deliberately broad term. It refers primarily to organized
medical groups that represent the views of their members in the political process, such as the
American Medical Association and the National Medical Association, state and local medical
associations, and specialty practice groups such as the American College of Physicians, the
American Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Society of Clinical Oncology. The term
also includes individual physicians. Given the supremacy of physicians in the hierarchy of the
profession, the focus of this article is on physicians, rather than on other medical professionals
such as nurses, physician assistants and other “physician extenders,” and non-physician medical
researchers.
2.
American medicine also has sought to combat other forms of external control. One
battle has been against efforts to promote competition among health professionals. Physicians
have long sought to prevent competition from non-physician rivals such as chiropractors,
nurses, and physician assistants, whose ability to compete has been constrained by preventing
them from working in hospitals, and by using licensure laws to limit the types of care that they
are allowed to provide (their “scope of practice”). See Barbara J. Safriet, Closing the Gap
Between Can and May in Health-Care Providers’ Scopes of Practice: A Primer for
Policymakers, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 301, 303 (2002). Physicians also have sought to limit
competition within the profession itself. These efforts have included restrictions on advertising
and other forms of patient solicitation, along with conflicts between specialists and general
practitioners, such as an attempt by the 47,000-member American College of Surgeons in the
late 1970s to prevent the 59,000 members of the American Academy of Family Physicians from
providing postsurgical care. See Koefoot v. Am. Coll. of Surgeons, 652 F. Supp. 882, 888–89
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (upholding the surgeons’ contention that the itinerant surgery rule is a
legitimate ethical canon); RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 28 (1989). Prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), antitrust
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In the early 1990s, forces within American medicine mounted an
unprecedented attack on both fronts.3 They pushed for laws permitting
designated professional medical associations to articulate “medical practice
guidelines” that would define the standard of care and, more importantly,
would serve as “safe harbors” so that physicians who demonstrated that
they had complied with the guidelines would be protected from malpractice
liability.4 If the drive had been successful, medicine would have achieved its
twin ambitions simultaneously; it would have resolved uncertainty about the
standard of care and, at the same time, secured the ability to set its own
standards without interference by outside forces concerned that the
standards might be economically unrealistic, self-servingly lax, or
applicable only to a small number of cases. For a time it looked like the
effort would succeed: several state legislatures enacted the proposal into
law, Congress considered adopting it for the entire nation, and President

scrutiny of the medical profession was discouraged by the perception that the ability of
organized medicine to restrict competition was limited by its largely local character, and by the
similarity between the practice of medicine and the practice of law, which also claimed an
exemption from the antitrust laws as a “learned profession.” See Carl F. Ameringer, Organized
Medicine on Trial: The Federal Trade Commission vs. the American Medical Association, 12 J.
POL’Y HIST. 445, 451 (2000); Robert Steinbuch, Why Doctors Shouldn’t Practice Law: The
American Medical Association’s Misdiagnosis of Physician Non-Compete Clauses, 74 MO. L.
REV. 1051, 1070 (2009). While Goldfarb addressed anticompetitive behavior by the bar, its
rejection of the learned professions exemption ushered in a period of vigorous antitrust
enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission against organized medicine, culminating in the
commission’s attack on the American Medical Association in 1975. Ameringer, supra at 445.
Another fight waged by the medical profession has been against control of physicians by
nonprofessional organizations. Originally, this took the form of efforts to prevent the formation
of corporations offering medical services. In the early part of the twentieth century, the AMA
was able to persuade state legislatures to adopt so-called “corporate practice of medicine laws”
to forbid this. See John D. Blum, Feng Shui and the Restructuring of the Hospital Corporation:
A Call for Change in the Face of the Medical Error Epidemic, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 5, 8 (2004).
By the end of the century, most states were ignoring the laws, had repealed them, or had enacted
laws enabling managed care plans to structure themselves as corporations. Id. at 9 (noting the
“demise of the corporate practice of medicine”); Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate
Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in The Modern Health Care Industry, 40
VAND. L. REV. 445, 478 (1987) (noting the “demise of the corporate practice of medicine
doctrine”); Edward B. Hirshfeld & Gail H. Thomason, Medical Necessity Determinations: The
Need for A New Legal Structure, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 47 (1996) (“While the majority of states
retain a bar on the corporate practice of medicine, corporate interests have managed to either
find a way around, through, or ignored the intent behind the corporate bar.”). The advent of
large private and governmental health insurance programs and their attempts to rein in costs
ultimately defeated efforts by organized medicine to resist external controls over physician
behavior.
3.
See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
4.
See infra Part II and accompanying notes.
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Clinton endorsed the approach when he was running for office and included
pilot programs in his 1993 health reform plan.5
By mid-decade, however, medicine’s campaign was in tatters.
Guidelines defining the legal standard of care were never promulgated or,
for reasons that will be discussed later, proved incapable of insulating
physicians from liability.6 Guideline development seemed to have come no
further than it had at the beginning of the decade, when the prestigious
Institute of Medicine of the National Academies of Science, the bastion of
academic medicine,7 had derided the guideline effort as “a confusing mix of
high expectations, competing organizations, conflicting philosophies, and
ill-defined or incompatible objectives,” and added that the guidelines
initiative “suffers from imperfect and incomplete scientific knowledge as
well as imperfect and uneven means of applying that knowledge.”8 Even the
American Medical Association (AMA) ended up withholding its support
from the safe harbors projects.9
With encouragement from the Obama administration, however, the
notion that medical practice guidelines can serve as “safe harbors” to
insulate physicians from malpractice liability has once again resurfaced. 10
Its champions sally forth, this time convinced that improved, “evidencebased” medical practice guidelines will be able to overcome the obstacles
that prevented their earlier success.11
This article explains why the renewed attack is doomed once again to
defeat. It begins by describing the historical power struggle waged by
5.
See Andrew L. Hyams, David W. Shapiro & Troyen A. Brennan, Medical Practice
Guidelines in Malpractice Litigation: An Early Retrospective, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L.
289, 308–10 (1996); see also infra note 152 and accompanying text.
6.
See infra discussion accompanying notes 164–65.
7.
See David E. Winickoff, Bioethics and Stem Cell Banking in California, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1067, 1076 n.37 (2006) (“IOM is the pre-eminent academic society of health
professionals, established in 1970 ‘to secure the services of eminent members of appropriate
professions in the examination of policy matters pertaining to the health and [sic] the public.’”)
(quoting NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ET AL., GUIDELINES FOR HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM
CELL RESEARCH iii (2005)).
8.
COMM. TO ADVISE THE PUB. HEALTH SERV. ON CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES, INST.
OF MED., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES: DIRECTIONS FOR A NEW PROGRAM 15 (Marilyn J.
Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1990) [hereinafter IOM 1990 REPORT].
9.
See Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine and the Law: The Courts Confront
Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 327, 343 (2001) (noting that AMA
attorney Edward Hirshfeld believed that “the American Medical Association opposes, for the
present at least, direct adoption of CPGs [clinical practice guidelines] as a legal standard and
urges instead that they be used only as evidence of the customarily observed professional
standard of practice and that their degree of authority be dependent upon the degree of their
acceptance among medical practitioners.”).
10. See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
11. See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
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medicine over control of the standard of care. The article then describes the
safe harbors concept and its historical background. Next, the article
critically analyzes the safe harbors approach and explains its scientific
weaknesses. The article then places the safe harbors concept in the context
of medicine’s historic power struggles. It concludes by defining the
appropriate role for practice guidelines in malpractice disputes.
I.

MEDICINE’S HISTORICAL QUEST FOR POWER

The self-regulatory powers of the professions date back to the Middle
Ages, when merchants, and later craftsmen, established guilds to attain
market power, which enabled them to limit outside competition, control
entry, and maintain quality standards.12 “Scholars’ guilds” that included
physicians and lawyers emerged beginning in the twelfth century and
formed the core of what would become universities.13 Lawyers and doctors
eventually split off from the universities in the late Middle Ages and early
Renaissance to form their own guilds.14
As sociologist Elliott Krause observes, physicians “tended to come from
lower social origins than lawyers. . . . And because the work of doctors
inevitably involved handwork, their guild was not far removed from a
regular craft organization.”15 By the eighteenth century, physicians in
England therefore sought to elevate their social status by creating two
distinct medical guilds, one for physicians—“gentlemen . . . [who] declined
to work with their hands and only observed, speculated, and prescribed” 16—
and the other for surgeons, the ones who did the dirty work, so to speak, and
who until 1745 belonged to the same guild as barbers.17 The American
colonies rejected the guild system, however, and physicians and surgeons
reunited into one medical profession.18 It was this unified profession that
began campaigning for control over its standard of care.

12. See generally ELLIOTT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS: PROFESSIONS, STATES, AND
ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THE PRESENT 3–4 (1996) (explaining the organization
and purpose of guilds).
13. See id. at 9.
14. See id. at 11.
15. See id. at 12. Krause explains that physicians were able to maintain their elite
professional status in Europe because of their university background, whereas in England,
nonprofessional university faculties expelled or “suppressed” their professional colleagues. Id.
at 12–13.
16. PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 37–38 (1982).
17. Id. at 38. They were eventually joined by apothecaries, who obtained the right after
1703 to attend patients and prescribe and compound drugs, but not to provide medical advice.
18. See id. at 39.
THE
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The Internal Struggle Over the Standard of Care

In seeking to control its standard of care, American medicine has had to
contend with forces both inside and outside the profession. Disputes within
the profession have revolved around whether there is a single, correct
overall approach to patient care, or instead, a number of correct
approaches.19 Disagreement was especially acrimonious during the
nineteenth century, when “irregulars” such as homeopaths and osteopaths
sought to gain supremacy, or at least hold their own, against “regulars,”
those who at the beginning of the nineteenth century adhered to “orthodox”
or “mainstream” views20 and who by the end of the century had adopted
what has become known as the modern scientific medical approach.
The effort by American medicine to define the standard of care within
the profession began with licensure.21 Interest in licensing laws grew in the
eighteenth century, spurred on by the desire of colonial doctors to attain the
same social status as their European counterparts.22 The first licensure law
19. A related set of disputes has concerned whether there is a single standard of care, the
standard of care of the physician, or multiple standards associated with different types of health
care professionals, such as nurses and physician assistants. As part of their effort to avoid
competition from non-physician caregivers, physicians have sought to restrict medical practice
to physicians by opposing the licensing of non-physicians. When this effort has proven
unsuccessful, physicians have attempted to limit the types of care that non-physicians can
provide, such as by preventing physician assistants from prescribing drugs. Another approach
has been to hold non-physicians to a physician’s standard of care. This can be done directly,
such as when medical students providing patient care are held to the standard of care of a
physician on the theory that they are supposed to be supervised by a physician, or indirectly,
such as when physicians are permitted to testify as experts in negligence cases against nonphysicians. See generally, Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, Extending Physician’s
Standard of Care to Non-Physician Prescribers: The Rx for Protecting Patients, 35 IDAHO L.
REV. 37 (1998) (providing an overview of malpractice standards and arguments for and against
non-physician prescribers).
20. In the early nineteenth century, orthodox practitioners emulated Dr. Benjamin Rush, a
signer of the Declaration of Independence. Rush and his disciples advocated three principal
remedies for whatever ailed the patient: phlebotomy or bleeding, the use of purgatives, and
blistering. See ANN ANDERSON, SNAKE OIL, HUSTLERS AND HAMBONES: THE AMERICAN
MEDICINE SHOW 22 (2000).
21. For description of the history of medical licensure, see Timothy Stoltzfus Jost,
Oversight of the Quality of Medical Care: Regulation, Management, or the Market? 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 825, 827–28 (1995); Chase-Lubitz, supra note 2, at 450–56.
22. See STARR, supra note 16, at 39 (noting that colonial physicians returned from
studying abroad with “the ambition to create in America a profession with the standards and
dignity that physicians in Europe possessed.”). The first law regulating physician behavior,
specifically the collection of physician fees, was passed in Virginia in 1639. The Virginia law
also regulated vaccination, quarantine, and isolation hospitals. See Glenn E. Bradford & David
G. Meyers, The Legal and Regulatory Climate in the State of Missouri for Complementary and
Alternative Medicine - Honest Disagreement Among Competent Physicians or Medical
McCarthyism?, 70 UMKC L. REV. 55, 60 (2001).
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was enacted by the City of New York in 1760, but when physicians began
forming medical societies, beginning in New Jersey in 1766,23 they
persuaded state legislatures to vest the power to license in these professional
associations.24 These medical licensure laws were weak, however. Kenneth
De Ville explains this in his landmark study of nineteenth century medical
malpractice:
Many of the statutes did not forbid unlicensed practice but merely
provided certificates of legitimacy to “qualified” doctors. In some
states unlicensed physicians were only prohibited from suing in
court for unpaid fees. Unlicensed physicians in these jurisdictions
could mitigate this handicap by requiring payment in advance.
Even in states where licensure laws provided penalties for
unsanctioned practice, juries generally would not convict
violators.25

Additionally, a diploma from a medical school served as a license.26
The weak medical licensure laws enacted in this initial wave might have
morphed into stricter strictures over time, but they fell prey to the antiprofessional, anti-government sentiment that gripped the nation in the first
half of the nineteenth century. These feelings were stoked by Andrew
Jackson’s election as President in 1829, which ushered in an attack on
elites, especially the “eastern elites,” including the professions of medicine
and law.27 The Jacksonians were joined by the followers of Samuel
Thomson, a New Hampshire farmer-turned-physician who gained a
following by declaring that illness resulted from physical imbalances in
earth, water, fire, and air,28 and that anybody who followed his teachings
(and paid him a franchise fee) could be a healer. The Jacksonians opposed
licensure on the ground that the laws merely created professional
monopolies;29 “[w]hat fundamentally destroyed licensure,” states Paul Starr,
“was the suspicion that it was an expression of favor rather than
competence.”30 The Thomsonians objected that licensure impermissibly
23.
24.
25.

See STARR, supra note 16, at 40.
Id. at 44.
KENNETH ALLEN DE VILLE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
AMERICA: ORIGINS AND LEGACY 85–86 (1990) (footnote omitted).
26. See STARR, supra note 16, at 44.
27. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF
PROFESSIONALISM IN AMERICA 73 (2d ed. 2005); James C. Mohr, American Medical
Malpractice Litigation in Historical Perspective, 283 JAMA 1731, 1732 (2000).
28. See DE VILLE, supra note 25, at 79.
29. See KRAUSE, supra note 12, at 30.
30. STARR, supra note 16, at 58. Theodore Ruger relates how “Pennsylvania never enacted
regular licensure legislation because in 1824 the governor vetoed the plan, writing in his veto
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interfered with individual liberty. One Boston newspaper proclaimed, for
example, that “[a]ny man in the United States has not only a natural right,
but a constitutional right to employ at pleasure, any person to administer
medicine to himself or family; and any man has a natural and constitutional
right to administer, when requested, such medicine as he judges best to cure
the sick . . . .”31 The effect of these twin assaults was that juries refused to
convict persons accused of violating the licensure laws,32 and state
legislatures repealed them.33 By 1840, none of the laws remained on the
books.34
Around mid-century, however, the picture started to change as the
“regular” medical professionals began to assert power over their rivals. In
1847 they established the American Medical Association,35 which began
lobbying state legislatures to reenact licensure laws.36 Steadily, the states
did so; by the early part of the twentieth century, Mohr explains, “the somessage that ‘the provisions of this bill seem to interfere with the undoubted right of our
citizens, secured by the constitution and laws, to . . . employ[] the person, who, in [their]
opinion, may be best qualified to afford relief to [their] sufferings.’” Theodore W. Ruger, Plural
Constitutionalism and the Pathologies of American Health Care, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 347,
355 (2011) (quoting Governor John Andrew Shulze, Veto Message (Dec. 8, 1824), reprinted in
PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES, PAPERS OF THE GOVERNORS 1817–1832, 543 (4th ser. 1900)).
31. An Attempt To Infringe upon the Constitution of the United States Defeated: Or Real
Republicanism, MEDICAL NEWS-PAPER; OR THE DOCTOR AND THE PHYSICIAN (Boston), Feb. 15,
1824, at 1, quoted in Ruger, supra note 30, at 355.
32. See STARR, supra note 16, at 58, quoting the president of the New York Medical
Society as stating in 1837 that “in trials for unlicensed practice, the testimony of physicians as
prosecution witnesses was ‘received with suspicion and disfavor by juries,’ making laws against
irregular practitioners ‘almost a dead letter.’”
33. See id.
34. As James Mohr observes, “the separate states made a virtue of opening the professions
to any and all practitioners who could persuade fellow citizens to employ their services . . . .
Consequently, by 1840, the entire United States had become a place where each profession had
to shift for itself, and so did each individual professional. Physicians found themselves adrift as
competitive agents, hustling for business in a market that included a wide spectrum of
alternative and often antagonistic healers, trained and untrained, ranging typically from the
woman down the lane who grew a few herbs in her garden to surgeons who had apprenticed in
European hospitals.” Mohr, supra note 27, at 1732. The resulting free-for-all had important
implications for the physicians’ risk of malpractice liability. See infra text accompanying notes
54–60.
35. See Mohr, supra note 27, at 1734. At the beginning of the 20th century, the AMA
became a confederation of state and local medical societies. See STARR, supra note 16, at 109.
As Abel describes, this “added the strength of state and local associations to the peak
organization . . . .” ABEL, supra note 2, at 45. But he points out that it also discouraged antitrust
enforcement against the AMA, discussed in note 2, supra, despite the fact that some
commentators argue that “the AMA’s motives were more driven by notions of economic
protectionism than by a good faith interest in the public health and the guarantee of quality
medical care.” Bradford & Meyers, supra note 22, at 61.
36. See Mohr, supra note 27, at 1734.
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called regular, science- and education-oriented AMA-type physicians had
gained control over perhaps 80% of US medical practice, and by the early
decades of the 20th century, they finally succeeded in gaining reasonably
effective licensing laws at the state level.”37
This second wave of licensure laws, which remain in force today, has
played a major role in defining the standard of care by only permitting
regulars to practice as physicians. Homeopaths, whom Starr describes as
viewing disease “fundamentally as a matter of spirit,” were discredited and
forced out of the practice altogether.38 Osteopaths, who originally
maintained that “most, if not all, diseases come from pressure on the nerves
caused by vertebra deviating from the normal,”39 threw in the towel and
became regulars.40 Chiropractors, who differed from osteopaths primarily in
believing that illness was caused by problems in the joints rather than in the
nerves,41 contented themselves with providing only limited types of care,
typically not including prescribing drugs, treating infectious diseases, or
performing surgery.42
At the same time that it was pressing for the reinstitution of medical
licensure, the AMA also mounted an effort to reform medical education.
Due in part to sectarian strife between rival schools of medical thought and
in part to entrepreneurial ambitions, physicians in nineteenth century
America established a plethora of medical schools.43 By 1850, Starr reports,
there were 42 schools in the United States, compared to 3 in France;44 by
37. Id. A 1984 study found that “the year a state enacted physician licensing laws was
directly related to the number of AMA members in that state.” Bradford & Meyers, supra note
22, at 61. The AMA’s effort received important backing from the U.S. Supreme Court in 1889,
when the Justices unanimously upheld a conviction under West Virginia’s licensure law for the
unlicensed practice of medicine in Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 128 (1889). Jost, supra
note 21, at 827.
38. See STARR, supra note 16, at 96. According to the homeopaths, says Starr, what
occurred inside the body did not follow physical laws. The homeopaths had three central
doctrines. They maintained first that diseases could be cured by drugs which produced the same
symptoms when given to a healthy person. This was the homeopathic “law of similars”—like
cures like. Second, the effects of drugs could be heightened by administering them in minute
doses. The more diluted the dose, the greater the “dynamic” effect. And third, nearly all diseases
were the result of a suppressed itch, or “psora.” Id. at 96–97.
39. Brown v. Shyne, 151 N.E. 197, 200 (N.Y. 1926) (Crane, J., dissenting).
40. STARR, supra note 16, at 108–09.
41. See id. at 108.
42. See Richard Duenas, United States Chiropractic Practice Acts and Institute of
Medicine Defined Primary Care Practice, 1 J. CHIROPR. MED. 155, 156 (2002).
43. See STARR, supra note 16, at 42.
44. Id. The first medical school in the colonies was founded in Philadelphia in 1765. Id. at
40. In 1791, it became the medical school at the University of Pennsylvania. ABRAHAM
FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA 5 (1910) [hereinafter
FLEXNER REPORT].
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1900, there were more than 150.45 Unlike their European counterparts,
moreover, American medical schools were not part of universities, and they
therefore lacked whatever rigor and legitimacy a university affiliation might
have imparted.46 Nor was there any system of accreditation.47
In 1904, the AMA established a Council on Medical Education, which
began agitating for uniform requirements for medical education.48 It also
began inspecting and evaluating the existing schools, fully approving of just
over half.49 Starr describes how the results of these reviews were disclosed
at an AMA meeting but never made public for fear of the adverse effect on
the profession; instead, he explains, the AMA asked the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching to conduct its own
investigation, under the leadership of a young educator (though not a
physician) named Abraham Flexner.50 The resulting exposé, known as the
Flexner Report, derided the growth of proprietary medical schools, the lack
of rigorous educational standards, and the consequent overproduction of
doctors,51 and urged that the poor schools be closed. Although as Starr
points out, a reduction in the number of new physicians would appeal to the
AMA because it “greatly enhanced the market position of private
physicians,”52 Flexner emphasized the need to improve the quality of care:
the surplus of doctors, he said, was “something worse than waste, for the
superfluous doctor is usually a poor doctor.”53
The AMA’s initiative was soon successful. In 1900, there were 160
medical schools with 25,213 students; by 1919, 75 of the schools had closed
and medical school enrollment had dropped to 13,789.54 By 1944, the
number of schools stood at 69.55 The AMA also gradually increased the
prerequisites for enrollment.56 Finally, state licensing boards adopted and
45. ABEL, supra note 2, at 48.
46. See STARR, supra note 16, at 40–41.
47. Nicole Huberfeld, Be Not Afraid of Change: Time to Eliminate the Corporate Practice
of Medicine Doctrine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 243, 250 (2004).
48. STARR, supra note 16, at 117–18.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 118. Flexner later helped found the Institute for Advanced Studies at
Princeton. See John Stachel, Heady Days at Princeton, 445 NATURE 263 (2007).
51. See FLEXNER REPORT, supra note 44, at 14. The report decried the fact that, while in
small towns in Germany there was one doctor for every 2,000 inhabitants, many towns in the
United States with fewer than 200 residents had one.
52. STARR, supra note 16, at 120.
53. FLEXNER REPORT, supra note 44, at 14.
54. ABEL, supra note 2, at 48.
55. Bradford & Meyers, supra note 22, at 62.
56. See ABEL, supra note 2, at 48. Starr calls the notion that the dominant allopathic
profession suppressed the irregulars a “myth,” claiming instead that the allopaths accepted the
irregulars at the beginning of the twentieth century, such as by according them membership on
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started to enforce educational requirements for physicians. Only applicants
who had attended “approved” schools could be licensed, and after 1910,
approval came to depend on a school receiving a satisfactory rating from the
AMA’s Council on Medical Education.57
Through its licensure and educational reform efforts, the medical
profession by the early twentieth century had gained effective control not
only over entry into the profession, but over the general contours of the
standard of care expected of its members.58 The upshot, according to
William Sullivan, was that “[b]y early in the twentieth century, organized
medicine achieved a guildlike monopoly over its sphere of interest.”59 The
new professionalism provided added benefits. Nicole Huberfeld explained:
The effect was to raise the bar for medical school applicants and
entrants, which influenced the quality of students and, thus, the
prestige of the medical profession as a whole. This contributed to
the perception of physicians that arose in the early 1900s—and
that remains today—of the physician as an omniscient healer and
autonomous health care provider.60

The internal battle over the standard of care, in short, largely had been won.

unitary state medical boards, and that the irregulars either were co-opted into mainstream
practice or withered away of their own accord. See STARR, supra note 16, at 107–08. But Starr’s
analysis misunderstands the passive-aggressive nature of co-optation: the destruction of the
irregulars by incorporating the new standards for medical education into state licensing
requirements was roundabout, but effective nonetheless. It heralded widespread recognition of
the validity of the scientific approach to medicine followed by the regulars, which showed the
irregulars that they either had to allow themselves to be co-opted, and thus play by these rules,
or perish.
57. KENNETH M. LUDMERER, LEARNING TO HEAL: THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN
MEDICAL EDUCATION 237 (1985). Ludmerer states that the Association of American Medical
Colleges also worked with licensing boards on educational requirements but does not give
details. Id.
58. “By [that time,]” states Mohr “the so-called regular, science- and education-oriented
AMA-type physicians had gained control over perhaps 80% of US medical practice. . . . ” Mohr,
supra note 27, at 1734. Organized medicine also began to assert control over the standards for
specialization. Jost states that “[t]he first specialty board, The American Board for Ophthalmic
Examinations, was formally created in 1916. Though licensure by specialty was considered
briefly in the late 1920s, it was rejected in favor of exclusive control over specialization by selfregulatory specialty boards. The system of private specialty boards that exercised this control
was firmly established by the time the Advisory Board for Medical Specialties was formed in
1933.” Jost, supra note 21, at 830.
59. SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at 56.
60. Huberfeld, supra note 47, at 250.
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The Struggle Against External Forces

While mainstream American medicine has engaged in consolidating its
power over contending schools of thought within the profession, it has also
sought to block efforts by external forces to influence the standard of care.
One set of forces consists of public and private health insurers who,
beginning in the second half of the twentieth century, have attempted to
manipulate the standard of care in order to control their costs.61 This article
focuses on the second major external force, the force of law, specifically,
the legal standard of care to which defendants are held in medical
malpractice cases.62
Suits for medical malpractice were extremely rare in the new Republic:
Even at a theoretical level, the medicolegal concept of malpractice
was so arcane and so unimportant in the United States that
American writers on medical jurisprudence, those most likely to
be interested in the subject as an aspect of legal medicine, did not
bother to mention it through the first 4 decades of the 19th
century.63

Mohr adds that “[t]he vast majority of US lawyers would not have known
how to draft an action for medical malpractice.”64
61. In an effort to curb health care spending, for example, both government and private
health insurers have promulgated guidelines on what care is appropriate in particular
circumstances. See Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice
Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 652–53 (2001)
(describing practice guidelines issued by health insurers); Rosoff, supra note 9, at 328–30
(describing guidelines issued by managed care plans and private and public health insurers).
Mello also describes how medical malpractice insurers use guidelines. Mello, supra, at 652–53;
see also John D. Ayres, The Use and Abuse of Medical Practice Guidelines, 15 J. LEGAL MED.
421, 437 (1994) (“[S]ome payers use parameters, indeed develop them, as a method to
maximize profits under the guise of reducing inefficient or unnecessary services.”).
62. Medical professionals have long confronted liability for providing substandard care. A
1374 case in which a surgeon was sued for improperly treating a patient’s hand wound was
dismissed for using the wrong writ. Y.B. 48 Edw. 3, fol. 6, pl. 11 (1374), cited in Allan H.
McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 550 (1959).
Theodore Silver cites a malpractice case decided in 1440. Theodore Silver, One Hundred Years
of Harmful Error: The Historical Jurisprudence of Medical Malpractice, 1992 WIS. L. REV.
1193, 1197 n.16 (1992). Mohr notes that “[t]he general concept of professional malpractice was
well embedded in English legal theory by the beginning of the 18th century,” and observes that
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, which were widely read by the American
colonists, “included under mala praxis (from which we derive the modern word malpractice),
‘Injuries . . . by the neglect or unskilful [sic] management of [a person’s] physician, surgeon, or
apothecary . . . because it breaks the trust which the party had placed in his physician, and tends
to the patient’s destruction.’” Mohr, supra note 27, at 1731.
63. Mohr, supra note 27, at 1731.
64. Id.
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Around 1840, the interregnum ended.65 Between 1840 and 1860, the
number of reported cases increased by 950%.66 Scholars attribute this first
“malpractice crisis” to a number of factors. One was the elimination of
licensing laws during the Jacksonian and Thompsonian period. “From the
public’s point of view,” states Mohr, “this opening of the professions left
few quality controls in place, good or bad.”67 Individual action holding
physicians accountable through malpractice suits was the main check that
remained, and it resonated with the anti-elitist atmosphere of the time. As
De Ville explains, “[l]icensure, in the Jacksonian mind, represented
regulation from the top down and appeared to benefit the physician by
creating an unfair monopoly and relying on artificial measures of merit.
Malpractice suits, however, represented regulation from the bottom up.”68
The public also had become disenchanted with orthodox medicine,69 which
consisted largely of harmful practices such as bleeding, purging, and
blistering.70 “[W]ith a long tradition of self-cure, home remedy, and folk
healing,” writes De Ville, Americans “had little patience with doctors who
demanded deference and privilege but offered few cures.”71 The loss of faith
in mainstream medicine was accompanied by a shift in religious faith. De
Ville observed:
Many Americans decisively changed their views on divine
providence in the first half of the nineteenth century. This
transformation allowed individuals to seek earthly causes for their
misfortunes, assign blame, and demand compensation. At the
same time, a variety of forces combined to make Americans
dramatically more concerned with physical well-being and
significantly more confident that they could do something about
it.72

65. See Allen D. Spiegel & Florence Kavaler, America’s First Medical Malpractice
Crisis, 1835-1865, 22 J. CMTY. HEALTH 283, 283–84 (1997). The authors identify western New
York State as the place where the proliferation of malpractice suits originated, id. at 284, but it
is not clear why it began there. The most common type of case after 1835 involved errors
alleged to have occurred in orthopedic care. Id. at 293.
66. Mohr, supra note 27, at 1732. Mohr points out that “[t]he population rose about 85%
during that period, which suggests that the rate of malpractice suits jumped abruptly by a factor
of roughly 10-fold during the middle 2 decades of the 19th century.”
67. Id.
68. DE VILLE, supra note 25, at 87.
69. Id. at 23–24 (“The antistatus, antiprofessional sentiment of the Jacksonian period
increasingly turned the lay public against orthodox, trained practitioners.”).
70. See Maxwell J. Mehlman, Quackery, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 349, 350–51 (2005).
71. DE VILLE, supra note 25, at 24.
72. Id.; see also Mohr, supra note 27, at 1732 (“The onset of medical malpractice
litigation corresponded with a sharp decline of religious fatalism and a dramatic rise of religious
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The medical profession stimulated malpractice suits in other ways than
by relying on unsafe and ineffective treatments. Regulars seized upon
malpractice liability as a way to curb the practice of irregulars. “In 1827, for
example,” describes Mohr, “Nathan Smith, MD, at Yale University had
complained to his medical students that the state of Connecticut was far too
lax in bringing malpractice indictments. ‘Even the most egregious Quacks
escape punishment as things now stand,’ he grumbled, and he hoped for
more action on this front.”73 The tactic backfired, however. Mohr adds:
[O]ver and over during the 1840s and 1850s, the nation’s besteducated and most professionally minded physicians observed
with a sort of defensive incredulity and disbelieving horror that
many, if not most, of the burgeoning numbers of malpractice suits
were being lodged not against charlatans and amateur hacks, but
against others like themselves, the best-educated and most
successful physicians.74

Moreover, growing competition led practitioners to encourage patients to
bring malpractice suits against practitioners who followed the same
doctrinal approach.75 Physicians brought liability down on their heads less
directly as well. Advances in medical science created unrealistic
expectations among patients,76 which practitioners fueled with selfpromotion.77 Ironically, the regulars’ success in seizing control of the
perfectionism, both of which were associated with the revivals of the 1820s and 1830s. As a
result, even fervently religious Americans were less willing than earlier generations to accept
physical afflictions as acts of divine providence. This same period also produced both the
nation’s first widespread efforts to improve physical fitness and its first great food reforms.
Americans were coming to the realization, or at least the hope, that bodily well-being could be
controlled and, perhaps, even improved upon.”).
73. Mohr, supra note 27, at 1733; see DE VILLE, supra note 25, at 24 (“Physicians’
authority and public respect also declined as a parade of alternative medical practitioners
offered their services to antebellum Americans.”).
74. Mohr, supra note 27, at 1732–33.
75. See DE VILLE, supra note 25, at 24 (“Physicians exacerbated their own descent in
esteem and contributed to the litigious trend. As medical men of all types became more plentiful
in the 1830s and 1840s, intraprofessional competition generated conflict, and many medical
men incited suits against fellow practitioners.”); Spiegel & Kavaler, supra note 65, at 298–99
(“Competition for patients and fees among regular physicians and between regular and irregular
doctors spurred the early increase in medical malpractice litigation. To improve their own
status, individual physicians willingly denigrated the therapeutic practices of their competitors.
Such public criticism may have encouraged patients to file lawsuits.”).
76. DE VILLE, supra note 25, at 24 (“Dramatic advances in several areas of medicine
created unrealistic expectations in both physicians and patients and blurred standards of care.”).
77. “With the popular newspapers of the late 1830s and early 1840s full of hyperbolic
claims and alleged success stories,” Mohr observes, “patients who failed to improve—or who
even regressed—were no longer willing to dismiss unfavorable medical outcomes as either
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standard of care from the irregulars also contributed to the problem.
“Regular physicians utilized educational textbooks and manuals that could
be considered norms or standards in court suits,” notes one pair of
commentators.78 “On the other hand, irregular physicians could not be sued
for undesirable results because no standards existed.”79
Yet the same forces of organized medicine that were pressing toward the
end of the century for the reinstatement of licensure laws and the reform of
medical education also were taking steps to curb the threat of malpractice
suits.80 The AMA and its affiliated medical societies encouraged their
members to defend their colleagues against suits by patients rather than to
use malpractice liability as a club with which to beat competitors. 81
inevitable or normal.” Mohr, supra note 27, at 1732. Mohr describes medical advertising of the
time as “aggressive and flamboyant.” Id.
78. Spiegel & Kavaler, supra note 65, at 301; see Mohr, supra note 27, at 1733 (“[T]here
can be no malpractice without established practice; physicians cannot be convicted of deviating
from accepted standards if no accepted standards exist. Amateurs and alternative healers had
always delivered what patients came to them for, be it hot baths or herbal teas, and could not be
sued for undesirable results. They claimed no fixed recipes and made a virtue of treating each
case individually. Educated physicians, on the other hand, could have texts and advanced
manuals (in steady production by 1840) used against them in court as codified norms from
which they could be accused of diverging.”).
79. Spiegel & Kavaler, supra note 65, at 301.
80. Mohr draws a connection between malpractice liability and the founding of the AMA:
“The American Medical Association (AMA) was founded in 1847, by no coincidence during
the same decade that the nation’s first malpractice crisis burst on the American medical scene.”
Mohr, supra note 27, at 1734. As the nineteenth century progressed, malpractice suits were
spurred on by additional developments. The number of lawyers increased as well as the number
of doctors, and the demographics of the legal profession began to change. At the beginning of
the century, explains De Ville, lawyers and doctors tended to come from the same social class,
and were further allied by both being targeted by the Jacksonians. But by the 1880s, more and
more lawyers were being drawn from the working classes, and “the two professions lost some
of their natural social affinity.” DE VILLE, supra note 25, at 194. The end of the century also
saw the advent of medical malpractice insurance, which “quickly produced a situation in which
nearly every physician was now worth suing.” Mohr, supra note 27, at 1735. Finally, judges
abandoned the ancient writ system, making it easier to file complaints. Id. at 1732.
81. DE VILLE, supra note 25, at 90 (“Medical societies, which were weak and contentious
in the 1840s, settled their differences, increased their membership, and successfully promoted
professional harmony by 1900. Likewise, a reorganized AMA had a unifying and pacifying
effect on the profession.”). Doctors sometimes resorted to rather odd forms of self-help to avoid
malpractice liability. De Ville describes “a bizarre 1871 anecdote [in which] a fracture patient
told his physician that he was going to sue for his badly healed leg. The physician asked the
man in to his office and offered to operate on the limb and repair the deformity. When the
patient refused, the doctor knocked him down, chloroformed him, and operated on the
unconscious man’s leg. The patient recovered and dropped all charges against the physician. A
medical journal praised the physician for having ‘the courage that many surgeons lack, to take
the responsibility to act, and look up the law afterward.’ Of course, such approaches to the
malpractice problem were rare.” Id. at 199–200.
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Physicians who testified against other physicians were threatened with
expulsion.82 Medical societies in New York, Chicago, and Cleveland also
began defending suits on behalf of their members; in the decade after it
began doing so, the Massachusetts Medical Society defended members in
ninety-one out of ninety-four cases brought against them, and lost only one
of the twelve that went to trial.83 Members of these societies also could
purchase cheaper malpractice insurance.84
By far the profession’s greatest achievement in combating malpractice,
however, was to use its growing power to alter the physician’s standard of
care itself. This was accomplished by inducing the courts to adopt
simultaneously the strict locality and customary care rules.
Prior to the torrent of malpractice cases around the middle of the
nineteenth century, American jurisprudence had not been blind to the fact
that patients received different medical care depending on where they lived.
De Ville, for example, cites an 1824 case, Lowell v. Faxon & Hawks, in
which the trial judge instructed the jury that “a physician in an ‘obscure
village’ was not required to possess the same degree of skill as his urban
counterpart,”85 as well as an 1860 treatise stating that “[t]he opportunities by
reason of locality, or other circumstances, of one portion [of the profession],
may be many times more favorable than those of another; and the
responsibilities resting upon them would be correspondingly greater.”86 As
Theodore Silver points out, however, these were merely references to the
traditional view that available knowledge and technology were factors to be
considered in determining if a physician acted reasonably.87
In the 1860s and 70s, however, organized medicine and receptive treatise
writers mounted a campaign to convince courts that local conditions should
replace the reasonableness standard altogether.88 Then, in an 1876 decision
by the Supreme Court of Vermont, Hathorn v. Richmond,89 the locality rule,
in Silver’s words, actually “drew its first breath.”90 The trial court had
82. Id. at 213.
83. STARR, supra note 16, at 111.
84. Id.
85. DE VILLE, supra note 25, at 55.
86. Id. at 211.
87. Silver, supra note 62, at 1230.
88. See DE VILLE, supra note 25, at 55, 213. In criticizing an instruction to a jury that a
physician was obligated to use “such ordinary care and skill as would best tend” to a patient’s
condition, the Kansas Supreme Court in 1870 quoted with approval a passage in a treatise
emphasizing the limitations on practice in small towns and rural areas compared with
“metropolitan towns.” Tefft v. Wilcox, 6 Kan. 46, 47, 64 (1870), cited in Silver, supra note 62,
at 1231.
89. 48 Vt. 557, 559 (1876).
90. Silver, supra note 62, at 1233.
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instructed the jury, inter alia, that the defendant was expected to have
“exercise[d] ordinary skill . . . . That being so, did Dr. Richmond use
ordinary and reasonable care in [treating the patient] – that is, in doing what
he did . . . did he [provide treatment] in the manner that doctors like himself
in the community would have done the same thing, or are ordinarily
accustomed to do the same thing?”91 The Vermont justices did not directly
address this language, but instead reversed and remanded the case based on
erroneous instructions relating to the relationship between the defendant and
an accompanying physician.92 However, the court, “[p]aying little attention
to the text” according to Silver,93 stated the following:
We think the rule as laid down by the court is substantially correct,
and in accordance with the well-settled law on the subject. There
are certain expressions used in the charge which, taken by
themselves, might seem to indicate a lower degree of skill than the
law requires; but when the whole charge is taken together, it
clearly gives the true rule, and so distinctly that the jury could not
have mistaken it.94

Courts around the country immediately began citing the Hathorn case
and following its locality rule.95 Coupled with the growing power of local
medical societies, this change in the common law, which was never adopted
in England,96 made it difficult if not impossible for plaintiffs in malpractice
cases to procure expert witnesses.97

91. Hathorn v. Raymond, 48 Vt. 557, 559 (1876) (emphasis added).
92. Id. at 565.
93. Silver, supra note 62, at 1233.
94. Hathorn, 48 Vt. at 562.
95. Courts also adopted the customary care rule announced in the case. See supra text
accompanying note 89.
96. Ruger, supra note 30, at 357 (“Thinly-sliced liability rules (such as the ‘locality rule,’
an invention of American common law never adopted in English law) permitted doctors to
practice medicine differently from physicians in other towns in the same state.”).
97. Quoting a 1969 article by Jon Waltz, a Maryland court striking down the rule in 1975
observed that “‘[i]t effectively immunized from malpractice liability any doctor who happened
to be the sole practitioner in his community. He could be treating bone fractures by the
application of wet grape leaves and yet remain beyond the criticism of more enlightened
practitioners from other communities.’” Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass’n, 349
A.2d 245, 249 (Md. 1975) (quoting Jon R. Waltz, The Rise and Gradual Fall of the Locality
Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 408, 411 (1969)). Moreover, noted
the court, “a ‘conspiracy of silence’ in the plaintiff’s locality could effectively preclude any
possibility of obtaining expert medical testimony,” even in a community with more than one
doctor. Id. (citing Note, Michigan Abandons “Locality Rule” with Regard to Specialists, 40
FORDHAM L. REV. 435, 438 (1971)); see also STARR, supra note 16, at 111 (“By adopting the
‘locality rule,’ the courts prepared the way for granting considerable power to the local medical

1182

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

The second way in which the medical profession used its power to seize
control of the standard of care was to shift from the prescriptive
“reasonable” care standard to the descriptive standard of the care that
physicians customarily provide. Once again, the Hathorn case is typically
cited as the source of the new rule.98 The trial judge had instructed the jury:
The question is, how much skill is [the physician] bound to have
and to exercise in order that he should not be liable for a disastrous
result? It is a little difficult to define it – you can only describe it
or illustrate it. The ordinary expression is, ordinary skill. That
means, such skill as doctors in the same general neighborhood, in
the same general lines of practice, ordinarily have and exercise in
like cases. If a doctor does in a case what the average class of
doctors are accustomed to do and would do in such a case, then he
exercises what is meant by ordinary skill in a given case. If he
exercises such skill, then he is not liable . . . .99

Stating that “[w]e think the rule as laid down by the court is substantially
correct, and in accordance with the well-settled law on the subject,”100 the
Supreme Court of Vermont gave the trial court’s description of the law the
same endorsement that it had given to the portion of the instruction that
embodied the locality rule. Of course, the customary standard was not wellsettled in the law; indeed, previous malpractice cases for the most part
appear to have employed the same reasonableness standard that prevails in
other areas of negligence law.101
society, for it became almost impossible for patients to get testimony against a physician who
was a member.”).
98. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 62, at 1224.
99. Hathorn, 48 Vt. at 558–59 (second and third emphases added).
100. Id. at 562.
101. Spiegel and Kavaler, for example, note that “in 1860, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that ‘the principle is plain and of uniform application, that when a person assumes the
profession of physician and surgeon, he must, in its exercise, be held to employ a reasonable
amount of care and skill.’” Spiegel & Kavaler, supra note 65, at 289. Silver explains somewhat
cryptically that early nineteenth century cases held physicians to the “skill” of an “ordinarily
competent and qualified physician” but shifted to the standard of “ordinary care” for how they
should actually treat patients. Silver, supra note 62, at 1220. In Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E. 760,
762 (N.Y. 1898), for example, the court held that “[a] physician and surgeon, by taking charge
of a case, impliedly represents that he possesses, and the law places upon him the duty of
possessing, that reasonable degree of learning and skill that is ordinarily possessed by
physicians and surgeons . . . . Upon consenting to treat a patient, it becomes his duty to use
reasonable care and diligence in the exercise of his skill . . . .” Silver, supra note 62, at 1222.
One commentator, however, cites an 1853 Pennsylvania case, McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa.
261, 267–68 (1853), for the proposition that the obligation of physicians was “to treat the case
with . . . such reasonable skill and diligence as are ordinarily exercised in his profession . . .
such as thoroughly educated surgeons ordinarily employ.” McCoid, supra note 62, at 550. The
court in Hathorn also had all but ignored the argument of the plaintiff’s attorney that “the
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Acceptance of the customary standard of care became widespread not
only in the subsequent case law but also in learned commentaries. As
recently as 2002, for instance, James Blumstein, a leading authority on
medical malpractice, stated that, while in ordinary tort cases “custom is a
factor to be considered and evaluated by a fact-finder in the determination
of negligence, but it is not determinative of the inquiry,” in medical
malpractice actions, “conventional doctrine relies on the ‘customary
practices of the medical profession as the benchmark of acceptable
behavior.’”102
While swapping reasonableness for what is customary was a major
change in medical malpractice law, it is important to understand what the
charge conveys the idea that if the defendant w[as] ‘average in skill with the doctors in the
neighborhood, he would not be liable.’ We insist that is not the criterion. If so, a bevy of quacks
in any locality could establish the amount of requisite skill.” Hathorn, 48 Vt. at 560. The only
potential acknowledgement of the attorney’s point was the court’s statement that “[t]here are
certain expressions used in the charge which, taken by themselves, might seem to indicate a
lower degree of skill than the law requires . . . .” Id. at 562. The court went on, it will be
recalled, to state that “when the whole charge is taken together, it clearly gives the true rule, and
so distinctly that the jury could not have mistaken it.” Id.
102. James F. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime: How Well Is It Doing In Assuring
Quality, Accounting For Costs, and Coping With an Evolving Reality In The Health Care
Marketplace?, 11 ANNALS HEALTH L. 125, 130 (2002). See also Clark C. Havighurst,
Decentralizing Decision Making: Private Contract versus Professional Norms, in MARKET
REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE: CURRENT ISSUES, NEW DIRECTIONS, STRATEGIC DECISIONS 24 (Jack
A. Meyer ed., 1983) (“[T]he courts draw the standards of care used in detecting professional
negligence almost exclusively from prevailing professional custom and practice . . . .”);
Bradford & Meyers, supra note 22, at 56 (“The standard of care is usually described as that
which physicians actually do in their everyday practice of medicine.”); James A. Henderson, Jr.
& John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued Reliance on Custom in
Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1384 (1994) (“Unlike some areas
of negligence law where the jury’s wisdom or the legislature’s fiat define the standard of care,
courts in medical malpractice cases have traditionally looked to the customary practice of the
medical profession as the benchmark of acceptable behavior.”) [The beginning of the title was
omitted from the final printed version]; McCoid, supra note 62, at 606 (“When we examine
cases of medical negligence, however, we find that custom does become, almost exclusively,
the measure of due care.”); Richard N. Pearson, The Role of Custom in Medical Malpractice
Cases, 51 IND. L.J. 528, 528 (1976) (“The well-nigh universal rule in this country is that a
physician will not be liable for negligence in a medical malpractice case unless he fails ‘to
possess and employ such reasonable skill and care as are commonly had and exercised by
reputable, average physicians in the same general system or school of practice . . . .’ Under this
rule, the medical profession is able to establish its own standard of care. Thus, it is medical
custom, rather than standards of reasonableness determined by judges and juries, against which
the conduct of a physician is measured.”); Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern
Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA L. REV. 909, 913 (2002) (“[T]he custom-based standard of care
‘gives the medical profession . . . the privilege, which is usually emphatically denied to other
groups, of setting their own legal standards of conduct, merely by adopting their own
practices.’”) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 189 (5th ed.
1984)).
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customary standard means. Proving whether or not a physician adhered to
the standard of care, it might be supposed, would require empirical data
showing what doctors actually do, as Blumstein implies when he says that
“the customary practice approach is ‘essentially an empirical inquiry that
focuses on the ways things are customarily done in the medical
community.’”103 But this is incorrect.104 Hardly any information exists about
what physicians actually do. No one conducts surveys or polls to use as
evidence in malpractice cases, and expert witnesses who testify about what
is customary are not required to, and do not, introduce any such empirical
evidence.105
A review of reported cases bears this out. Only five reported cases have
referred to the use of empirical evidence of physician practice as bearing on
the standard of care, and a practice survey was introduced to establish the
standard of care in only one: an Illinois appellate case from 1994.106 On the
103. Blumstein, supra note 102, at 131. Blumstein disingenuously puts his claim in quotes
as if to show that it has support; in fact, he is merely quoting himself. See id. at 131, n.28
(quoting James F. Blumstein, Cost Containment and Medical Malpractice, in HEALTH CARE
DELIVERY AND TORT: SYSTEMS ON A COLLISION COURSE? 76, 89 (Elizabeth Rolph ed., 1993)).
104. For discussion of custom and recognition that empirical evidence of what doctors
actually do is not provided, see Tim Cramm, Arthur J. Hartz & Michael Greene, Ascertaining
Customary Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
699, 711–12 (2002); Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural
Reform in Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943, 978–79 (2004).
105. As Tim Cramm and his colleagues explain, “published research or formally collected
data relevant to customary practice in a specific case are virtually never available, and the
expert’s experience with the practice of others is limited. This experience consists of reviewing
the medical records of patients who are shared with partners, referred for consultation, or
referred by administrators because of patients’ complaints or cost. Medical witnesses do not
have experience with how representative physicians generally practice and do not systematically
record the experience they do have. Physicians’ opinions about medical practice come from
their own training (including continuing education) and their own patient care. At best, an
expert may understand the practical constraints or trade-offs involved in managing certain types
of patients or have knowledge about available resources in specific settings (e.g., in a rural
hospital). The expert can only guess at customary practice.” Cramm et al., supra note 104, at
710. Cramm and his colleagues cite Mark Hall, who states that “when the plaintiff’s witness
states that the defendant’s conduct was not within the standards of the profession, he really
means only that ‘he would not have treated the patient that way,’” Mark A. Hall, The Defensive
Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 119,
127 (1991), and prominent health services researcher David Eddy, who explains that “when an
expert answers a question about a community standard it is extremely unlikely that he or she has
any real data on actual practices. It is far more likely that what an expert believes is the practice
in a community is what the expert personally believes should be the standard of care.” David M.
Eddy, The Use of Evidence and Cost Effectiveness by the Courts: How Can it Help Improve
Health Care?, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 387, 396 (2001).
106. Kramer v. Milner, 639 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). Another case considered a
nationwide survey of the practices of gastroenterologists potentially to be evidence of the
standard of care, but refused to overturn the trial court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration
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other hand, courts in several cases have explicitly held that evidence of
actual custom is not probative. Tennessee courts of appeals have twice
rejected the standard of “what []a majority of physicians in a community
would consider to be reasonable medical care” as the standard of care in
favor of “the reasonable degree of learning, skill, and experience that is
ordinarily possessed by others of his profession” because the former would
“require a poll of physicians practicing in a community to determine the

to permit the survey to be introduced. Mitchell v. United States, 141 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 1998). The
court rejected the survey on the basis that it was not definitive, having only a 38.5% response
rate which was described by the authors of a report of the survey as “less than ideal,” and
because the survey “did not take into consideration the particulars of a patient’s medical history,
even though the experts testifying before the trial judge agreed that such particulars are
indispensable in determining the proper treatment to be followed.” Id. at 18–19. As will be seen,
the failure to allow for individual patient differences is a common weakness in practice
guidelines. See infra the discussion in the text accompanying notes 167, 190–91. The court in
Kramer held that the trial court had erred in not instructing the jury that it could consider an
American Cancer Society survey of practitioner compliance with its mammography guidelines
as evidence of the standard of care, stating that “the expert testimony analyzing the compliance
rates of doctors with ACS and other organization’s recommendations . . . constitutes ‘evidence
of professional conduct’” as provided in an Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction. Kramer, 639
N.E.2d at 161. In a third case, the Supreme Court of Oregon held that it was not hearsay for an
expert to describe as part of the basis for his opinion his conversations with colleagues, stating
that “the appropriate medical practice is most commonly proven by learning what other
specialists in the field do in the area. The appropriate medical practice in this case could have
been observed by the physician at a hospital or in any other clinical setting; learned at a staff
meeting at a hospital or at an educational seminar; ascertained from reading medical literature;
and, finally, the appropriate medical practice could be ascertained by discussing the proper
method for sorting out Pap smear reports with other doctors in the community as to what they
do.” Jefferis v. Marzano, 696 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Or. 1985) (en banc). An Ohio case held that an
expert’s description of discussions with “multiple colleagues” as evidence of the standard of
care was not hearsay. Deagan v. Dietz, 94 C.A. 75, 1996 WL 148612 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 29,
1996). Finally, a case involving the alleged negligence of a blood bank, Quintana v. United
Blood Services, 811 P.2d 424, 430 (Colo. App. 1991), aff’d on other grounds 827 P.2d 509
(Colo. 1992), asserted that proof of custom requires some sort of survey, but the assertion was
merely dicta. The Court of Appeals quoted McCoid’s description of the “preferred position” of
professions “in which the accepted or customary practices of similarly trained and situated
professionals are generally taken as conclusive evidence of the professional standard of care.”
Id. at 430; see McCoid, supra note 62. The court added that “the nature of professional activity
insures that this professional negligence standard is a fluctuating standard defined only upon a
contemporaneous survey of the practices of the profession’s members.” Quintana, 811 P.2d at
430 (emphasis in original). But the court proceeded to reject the plaintiff’s argument that the
professional standard applies to blood banking. Id. at 431. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme
Court held that the professional standard does apply, but that the standard of custom is subject
to being rebutted as unreasonable. 827 P.2d at 524. See the discussion of the distinction between
custom and reasonableness in the text supra at notes 98–100. As will be seen, the failure to keep
guidelines up to date is another common weakness. See the discussion in the text accompanying
infra note 196.
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standard of care.”107 The Supreme Court of Texas rejected the “respectable
minority” standard of care because it “could convey to a jury the incorrect
notion that the standard for malpractice is to be determined by a poll of the
medical profession.”108 Finally, a Washington court of appeals held that a
trial judge had correctly refused to admit as an exhibit the results of a poll
that the defendant conducted prior to trial and sought to introduce “to
disclose what the standard of care was.”109
Delinking the customary standard from empirical evidence of actual
practice in fact diminishes the profession’s control over its internal standard
of care by giving doctors greater freedom to practice as they please.110 It
also reduces the profession’s ability to resist external forces by affording
judges and juries more discretion to base the standard of care on their
assessment of conflicting expert testimony. But the profession more than
makes up for this loss of control by discouraging judges and juries from
second-guessing medical experts about whether or not the standard of care
that they endorse is reasonable. In negligence law generally, what is
customary is not dispositive of the standard of care that is owed.111 Under
the custom standard, however, the only question is what in fact the standard
of care is and whether or not the physician fulfilled it, not whether the
standard is too high or too low to produce socially desirable results. As the
California court stated in Osborn v. Irwin Memorial Blood Bank,112 “in
[medical negligence] cases like ours where experts are needed to show
negligence, their testimony sets the standard of care . . . and is said to be

107. Godbee v. Dimick, 213 S.W.3d 865, 896 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Hopper v. Tabor,
03A01-9801-CV-00049, 1998 WL 498211, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 1998).
108. Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. 1977).
109. Klink v. G.D. Searle & Co., 614 P.2d 701, 704 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
110. Theodore Ruger makes a similar point: “Like previous episodes of health reform in the
United States, today’s emerging constitution of health security is imperiled by the persistence of
a much older constitution of authority in American medicine, one that prioritizes individualistic
therapeutic choice over other more systemic values.” Ruger, supra note 30, at 348.
111. Learned Hand famously stated, “There are, no doubt, cases where courts seem to make
the general practice of the calling the standard of proper diligence; we have indeed given some
currency to the notion ourselves. Indeed in most cases reasonable prudence is in fact common
prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the
adoption of new and available devices. It may never set its own tests, however persuasive be its
usages. Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so imperative that
even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.” The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737,
740 (2d Cir. 1932) (citation omitted).
112. 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
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‘conclusive.’”113 In Philip Peters’ words, “[D]eference to customary
standards [places] the profession above the law.”114
For reasons that will be explained later, however, the pendulum swung
back from the heyday of professional power that began in the late 19th
century and reached its apogee in the 1950s and 1960s.115 Control within the
profession over the legal standard of care slipped as government and private
health insurance, and especially managed care, brought pressure on
physicians to change their behavior for economic reasons.116 Irregulars, now
called practitioners of “complementary and alternative medicine,” staged a
comeback.117 The locality rule was abandoned in almost all states.118 In

113. Osborn v. Irwin Mem’l Blood Bank, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 101, 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(citation omitted).
114. Peters, supra note 102, at 958–59; see also M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of
Health Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 389, 462 (2009) (“The malpractice system’s greatest failing,
from a quality and value perspective, is its reliance on clinical practitioners to specify standards
of care.”). The conclusive effect of proof of customary practice is especially evident in cases
like Osborn, in which the experts agreed on what was customary. (“Here it is undisputed that no
blood bank in the country was doing what the plaintiffs’ experts’ standard of care would require
of Irwin . . . .” Osborn, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 125.) This is why Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981,
982–83 (Wash. 1974) (en banc), the lone case in which the court refused to accept custom as
setting the standard of care despite agreement among the experts that the defendants did what
was customary, stands so alone and has attracted such criticism. See Osborn, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
126 (“Most of the commentary on this case has been unfavorable.”).
115. See JAMES C. ROBINSON, THE CORPORATE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE: COMPETITION AND
INNOVATION IN HEALTH CARE 26 (1999).
116. See generally STARR, supra note 16, at 310–78.
117. In the last decade of the twentieth century, interest grew in non-mainstream medical
practices. See Kathleen M. Boozang, Western Medicine Opens the Door to Alternative
Medicine, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 185, 194 (1998) (“The most recent alternative medicine
resurgence largely results from a generational pursuit of independence and nonconformity.”);
Andrew M. Knoll, The Reawakening of Complementary and Alternative Medicine at the Turn of
the Twenty-First Century: Filling the Void in Conventional Biomedicine, 20 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 329, 335 (2004) (“[S]ome explanation must be given to justify the
resurgence of CAM as more than mere desire for caring without substantive curing.”). A Los
Angeles Times Article states that sales of herbal remedies increased 100 percent between 1994
and 1998, and that “historians trace the resurgence of alternatives to the back-to-nature 1960s . .
. .” Terence Monmaney & Shari Roan, Hope or Hype?; Alternative Medicine is Edging into the
Mainstream, with Californians Leading the Way. The Appeal is Complex, and Debate Rages
About its Effectiveness and Scientific Oversight, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1998, at A1.
118. Michelle Huckaby Lewis, John K. Gohagan & Daniel J. Merenstein, The Locality Rule
and the Physician’s Dilemma: Local Medical Practices vs the National Standard of Care, 297
JAMA 2633, 2635 (2007). The box lists forty-five states that have adopted either a national or
similar locality standard in place of a “same community” or “statewide” standard.
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addition, judicial deference to professional custom began to disappear, 119
which Peters regards as momentous:
Whether de jure or de facto, the shift away from the customary
standard and toward a reasonable physician standard takes the task
of standard-setting away from the profession and assigns it to the
jury. The centrality of this doctrinal shift cannot be overstated. The
delegation of standard-setting authority to the professions is
unique in tort law. It is the foundation upon which the field of
medical malpractice law has been built.120

The “malpractice crises” that began in the 1970s, however, gave the
profession an opportunity to reassert its power. By exaggerating the impact
on physicians and patients and blaming the legal system, 121 the profession
lobbied successfully in many states for caps on damages, elimination of
joint and several liability, reduction in the period of time allowed to file
suit, offsets for amounts received from collateral sources, pretrial screening
panels, periodic payments for future losses, and limitations on plaintiff
attorneys’ contingent fee agreements.122 In addition, the profession also
seized the chance to increase its control over the standard of care. It
mounted a campaign against expert witnesses who testified for plaintiffs,123
a tactic, it will be recalled, that medical societies employed at the end of the
19th century.124 But more significantly, the profession set aside its historic
opposition to “cookbook medicine” to support the use of medical practice
guidelines as safe harbors against malpractice liability.125 To understand
how significant an expansion of professional power this would represent, it
is first necessary to trace the history of the safe harbors concept.

119. Eleven states and the District of Columbia have expressly abandoned the standard of
custom, while an additional nine states have done so implicitly by endorsing the “reasonable
physician” standard. Peters, supra note 102, at 914.
120. Id. at 919–20.
121. For an analysis of the “crises,” see TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH
(2005).
122. See MICHELLE M. MELLO, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
IMPACT OF THE CRISIS AND EFFECT OF STATE TORT REFORMS 7 (May 2006).
123. At its April 2004 annual meeting, for example, the Federation of State Medical Boards
adopted a resolution that false, fraudulent, or deceptive testimony given by a medical
professional while serving as an expert witness should constitute unprofessional conduct, as
defined in state licensure acts. Russell M. Pelton, Medical Societies’ Self-Policing of
Unprofessional Expert Testimony, 13 ANNALS HEALTH L. 549 (2004); Jennifer A. Turner,
Going After the ‘Hired Guns’: Is Improper Expert Witness Testimony Unprofesional Conduct or
the Negligent Practice of Medicine? 33 PEPP. L. REV. 275, n. 189 (2006).
124. See supra discussion in the text accompanying notes 83–85.
125. See infra discussion in the text accompanying notes 172–78.
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THE EARLY HISTORY OF PRACTICE GUIDELINES AS SAFE HARBORS

The practice of physicians receiving recommendations from learned
colleagues on how to care for their patients is probably as old as medicine
itself,126 but beginning around 1990, it took on new urgency. The major
impetus was the research conducted by John Wennberg and colleagues at
the Dartmouth Medical School beginning in the 1970s, in which they
investigated variations in the care that patients ostensibly suffering from the
same afflictions received in different parts of the country. What they found
were wide variations that could not be explained in any scientific manner.
Shannon Brownlee detailed some of these occurrences in her book
Overtreated:
Patients with back pain were 300 percent more likely to get
surgery in Boise, Idaho, than in Manhattan. Doctors in hospitals
affiliated with Harvard Medical School admitted patients to the
intensive care unit four times more often than their colleagues at
Yale University School of Medicine. Arthroscopic knee surgery—
which would later be shown to be entirely ineffective at treating
knee pain due to arthritis—was performed five times more often
on arthritic patients in Miami than in Iowa City.127
126. David Eddy says, “Practice policies have been used for centuries.” David Eddy,
Practice Policies: Where Do They Come From? 263 JAMA 1265, 1265 (1990). Michelle M.
Mello says clinical practice guidelines, a more formalized form of professional advice, “have
been part of medical practice for more than half a century.” Mello, supra note 61, at 649.
127. SHANNON BROWNLEE, OVERTREATED 34 (2007). See James F. Blumstein, supra note
102, at 136–37 (“Dr. John Wennberg has pioneered research that shows dramatic and
scientifically unexplained variations in medical practice across geographic regions. These data
call into the question the hard scientific basis of much medical practice . . . .”); Mello, supra
note 61, at 649 (“Interest in the possibilities of using CPGs to improve medical practice grew in
the 1970s and 1980s after health services researchers discovered wide variations in care
processes between different geographic locations within the United States. Practice variation is
thought to imply an overuse of medical procedures in some geographic areas, and/or an
underuse in other areas, that is attributable to physicians’ uncertainty regarding appropriate
indications for particular treatments.”); Katherine Van Tassel, Hospital Peer Review Standards
and Due Process: Moving from Tort Doctrine Toward Contract Principles Based on Clinical
Practice Guidelines, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1179, 1218–19 (2006) (“A series of startling
scientific studies raises the question of whether the concept of ‘customary care’ is, in fact, a
fiction. These studies reveal striking and unjustifiable variations in the choices that physicians
made in the diagnosis and treatment of the same clinical condition.”). For Wennberg’s research
findings and commentary on them, see John E. Wennberg et al., Geography and the Debate
over Medicare Reform, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Feb. 13, 2002), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2002/02/13/hlthaff.w2.96.short; David Blumenthal,
The Variation Phenomenon in 1994, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1017, 1017–18 (1994); James M.
Perrin et al., Variations in Rates of Hospitalization of Children in Three Urban Communities,
320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1183 (1989); John E. Wennberg et al., Are Hospital Services Rationed in
New Haven or Over-Utilized in Boston?, 329 LANCET 1185 (1987); Mark R. Chassin et al.,
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When they analyzed Medicare data, Wennberg and his colleagues
discovered that patients in Miami averaged six times more visits to
specialists and spent twice as much time in the hospital and in intensive care
units than comparable patients in Minneapolis, with no differences in
outcomes.128 Wide variations even occurred within the same state. “In
Vermont, for example,” reports Peters, “eight percent of the people in one
community had their tonsils taken out while seventy percent of the residents
of a different community had the surgery. In Iowa, the rate of prostate
removal ranged from 15% to 60%.”129 As James Blumstein acknowledges,
“[t]his, of course, has been an embarrassment to the profession . . . ,”130 and
“[w]hat ensued, of course,” explains Clark Havighurst, a leading health law
scholar, “was a campaign by organized medicine to reestablish its
credibility and maintain its authority over medical practice by producing
‘clinical practice guidelines.’”131 Rising health care costs, concerns about
medical errors and the quality of care, and what some perceived to be
Variations in the Use of Medical and Surgical Services by the Medicare Population, 314 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 285, 287 (1986); David M. Eddy, Variations in Physician Practice: The Role of
Uncertainty, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Fall 1984, at 74, 77–80; John E. Wennberg, Dealing With
Medical Practice Variations: A Proposal For Action, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Summer 1984, at 6, 7;
John E. Wennberg et al., Professional Uncertainty and the Problem of Supplier-Induced
Demand, 16 SOC. SCI. MED. 811, 812–17 (1982); John E. Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small
Area Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182 SCI. 1102 (1973).
128. Richard S. Saver, Squandering the Gain: Gainsharing and the Continuing Dilemma of
Physician Financial Incentives, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 200–01 (2003).
129. Peters, supra note 102, at 946–47.
130. Blumstein, supra note 102, at 136. See Ronen Avraham, Clinical Practice Guidelines:
The Warped Incentives in the U.S. Healthcare System, 37 AM. J.L. MED. 7, 16 (2011) (“Medical
guidelines have proliferated over the last fifty years, but starting in the 1990s, the number of
guidelines being produced increased dramatically. This increase coincided with widely
publicized studies that demonstrated a large variation in clinical practice across geographic
areas and even within the same area.”); Clark C. Havighurst, Practice Guidelines for Medical
Care: Policy Rationale, 34 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777, 779 (1990) (“The current [1989] consensus on
the need for some kind of practice guidelines is directly traceable to the work of a handful of
physician scholars who pioneered in the study of actual medical practice—what physicians
actually do. These researchers demonstrated with striking evidence that physicians’ methods of
treating many similar conditions vary widely for no apparent reason.”); Gary W. Kuc,
Comment, Practice Parameters as a Shield Against Physician Liability, 10 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 439, 444–45 (1994) (“Since the late 1980s, practice parameters have
rapidly emerged as the medical profession’s response to the charge that the medical standard of
care ‘appears to be arbitrary—highly variable, with no obvious explanation.’ Supporting this
claim are studies by epidemiologists who have documented wide geographic variations in the
rate of utilization of health care services and specific medical procedures. For example, in
Maine the chance of a woman having a hysterectomy by the age of seventy varies across the
state from less than 20% to more than 70%.”).
131. Clark C. Havighurst, I’ve Seen Enough! My Life and Times in Health Care Law and
Policy, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 107, 121 (2004).
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perverse effects of the malpractice system added to the pressure to find
some means to rationalize medical practice. One solution that was put
forward was for the profession to adopt practice guidelines, which the
Institute of Medicine (IOM) defined as “systematically developed
statements to assist practitioner and patient decisions about appropriate
health care for specific clinical circumstances.”132
Practice guidelines rapidly came to be viewed as a virtual panacea for the
problems that beset modern medicine. Their “great promise,” states Arnold
Rosoff, is “to improve the quality of care, help contain health care costs,
reduce disputes about coverage under health plans, and ease the financial
and other burdens of medical malpractice litigation on the health care
system . . . .”133 In 1990, Eddy predicted that they “have the potential to
affect the quality and cost of medical care more profoundly than all the new
treatments of the past or next decade.”134
Both public and private entities took up the challenge. In 1990, Robert
Brook of the RAND collaborated with the AMA in an effort to create
guidelines, with the aim of establishing them for 50 to 100 of the most
common, expensive, and controversial procedures.135 The Blue Cross/Blue
Shield Association, the umbrella organization for the dozens of BC/BS
plans around the nation, asked the American College of Physicians to
develop guidelines for fifteen of the most common diagnostic tests. 136 In
132. IOM 1990 REPORT, supra note 8, at 38. In contrast to informal advice from colleagues,
practice guidelines supposedly represent the views of medical experts developed in a systematic
manner. Similar efforts have included “technology assessment,” expert analyses focused on
specific medical technologies such as new imaging devices or surgical procedures. For
descriptions of federal medical technology assessment, see David Blumenthal, Federal Policy
Toward Health Care Technology: The Case of the National Center, 61 MILBANK MEM’L FUND
Q. 584, 595 (1983); Eleanor D. Kinney, Comparative Effectiveness Research Under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act: Can New Bottles Accommodate Old Wine?, 37 AM. J.L. &
MED. 522, 525–26 (2011).
133. Rosoff, supra note 9, at 330.
134. Eddy, supra note 126, at 1265. See also Kevin C. Chung & Melissa J. Shauver,
Crafting Practice Guidelines in the World of Evidence-Based Medicine, 124 PLASTIC &
RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 1349 (2009) (“Practice guidelines embrace evidence-based
medicine by rigorously distilling the highest level of evidence from the literature in an effort to
help physicians in the compassionate and scientific treatment of patients.”); William R. Trail &
Brad A. Allen, Government Created Medical Practice Guidelines: The Opening of Pandora’s
Box, 10 J.L. & HEALTH 231, 233, 258 (1995–1996) (“One solution that purports to provide cost
containment, improved quality of care, and maintain physician responsibility is medical practice
guidelines . . . . Medical practice guidelines are a truly rare reform concept that show real
potential for improving the quality of care, decreasing costs, and reducing malpractice litigation
all through one program.”).
135. See Harris Meyer, AMA, Rand, Academic Canters to Develop Practice Guides, AM.
MED. NEWS, April 6, 1990, at 3, cited in Hall, supra note 105, at 124.
136. Hall, supra note 105, at 124.
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1989, Congress created the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research
(AHCPR), within which the Office of the Forum for Quality and
Effectiveness in Health Care was supposed to “arrange for” the
development and periodic review and updating of practice guidelines.137
The potential for using practice guidelines to reduce doctors’ exposure to
the risk of malpractice liability had already been recognized. Stung by a
1982 exposé on the ABC News program 20/20 entitled “The Deep Sleep,
6,000 Will Die or Suffer Brain Damage” that documented numerous cases
of preventable anesthesia errors, and faced with high and rapidly rising
malpractice insurance premiums,138 anesthesiologists, through the American
Society of Anesthesiologists, initiated a broad safety campaign that
included promulgating practice guidelines that were adopted by the Harvard
Medical School and its teaching hospitals.139 The result was a dramatic
reduction in both anesthesia-related errors and malpractice premiums.140
137. The AHCPR was created by amendments (OBRA 1989, Pub. L. 101–239, § 6103) to
the Public Health Service Act (Pub. L. 101–239). The charge of the Office of the Forum for
Quality and Effectiveness in Health Care was to “arrange for” “clinically relevant guidelines
that may be used by physicians, educators, and health care practitioners to assist in determining
how diseases, disorders, and other health conditions can most effectively and appropriately be
prevented, diagnosed, treated, and managed clinically . . . .” IOM 1990 REPORT, supra note 8, at
3. The Institute of Medicine (“IOM”) report points to the use of term “arrange for” as “one key
indicator of the extent to which the drafters of OBRA 89 sought to create a public-private
enterprise with respect to guidelines development. Their vision was that the Forum would itself
develop no guidelines; guidelines were not to be federal creations.” Id.
138. “Anesthesiology [malpractice] premiums were . . . among the very highest—in many
areas, two to three times the average cost for all physicians,” explain David Hyman and Charles
Silver. David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is
Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 893,
920 (2005). Ellison C. Pierce Jr., a retired professor of anesthesiology at Harvard Medical
School who led the anesthesia guideline effort, described an Arizona anesthesiologist whose
premiums abruptly rose from $20,000 to $50,000. Joseph T. Hallinan, Heal Thyself: Once Seen
as Risky, One Group Of Doctors Changes Its Ways—Anesthesiologists Now Offer Model of
How to Improve Safety, Lower Premiums—Surgeons Are Following Suit, WALL ST. J., June 21,
2005, at A1. This was the second wave of large premium increases in ten years. Id.
139. See HUMAN RESOURCES, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE GAO/HRD-94-8,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: MAINE’S USE OF PRACTICE GUIDELINES TO REDUCE COSTS (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 GAO REPORT]. The campaign included mandatory anesthesia patient
monitoring standards and safety precautions, standardized operations for machines, and
retrofitting machines with safety devices. Hyman & Silver, supra note 138, at 921. The ASA
reviewed malpractice claims data and other information to identify areas where improvement
was needed. Id.
140. Hyman and Silver describe how mortality rates fell from 1 in 10,000 to 20,000 to 1 in
200,000, malpractice insurance claims related to anesthesia dropped from 11% to 3.6% in
fifteen years, and premiums for anesthesiologists at Harvard hospitals declined from $17,690 to
$11,750 in one year. Hyman & Silver, supra note 138, at 918–19. For anesthesiologists in
general, “the 2002 average premium was $18,000—about the same as in 1985 and much lower
than for most specialties.” Id. at 919. Today, add Hyman and Silver, “adverse events and
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The anesthesia experience showed that practice guidelines could
decrease medical errors, which in turn could diminish physicians’
malpractice risk. But in 1990, the Maine State Legislature enacted a scheme
that eliminated the critical step of having practice guidelines actually
improve the quality of care. Instead, the legislation established a five-yearlong demonstration project, renewed for another five years in 1997, which
authorized physician specialty groups in Maine to create guidelines and
permitted physicians to assert compliance with the guidelines as a defense
in malpractice cases.141
The Maine demonstration project, as it became known, was supported by
a coalition called the Healthcare Roundtable representing (1) the Maine
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, (2) Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Maine, (3) the Maine Hospital Association, (4) the Maine Medical
Association, (5) the Maine Ambulatory Care Coalition (representing rural
health centers), and (6) the Maine State Employees Association;142 the
prime mover, however, was the Maine Medical Association, which drafted
the bill and persuaded an association ally in the Maine Senate to sponsor
it.143 The legislation initially authorized three medical specialty groups to
promulgate guidelines: anesthesiologists, emergency physicians, and
obstetricians and gynecologists.144 These three specialties were chosen
because of the frequency of malpractice suits against practitioners and the
size of awards,145 the willingness of specialists in these areas to participate

emergencies are so rare that anesthesiologists use simulators to practice responding to adverse,
anesthesia-related events.” Id. at 920. Hyman and Silver point out that “the ASA’s actions cast
serious doubt on the conventional wisdom that malpractice lawsuits impede error reduction.
Anesthesiologists worked hard to protect patients because of malpractice exposure, not in spite
of it.” Id. at 921.
141. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, §§ 2971–2978 (repealed 1999). The original bill would have
granted physicians immunity from malpractice suits if they could show that they had complied
with the guidelines, but the Judiciary Committee rejected immunity in favor of allowing
compliance to serve as an affirmative defense. For more discussion of the immunity approach,
see Jennifer Begel, Maine Physician Practice Guidelines: Implications for Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 47 ME. L. REV. 69, 77 (1995); Hall, supra note 105, at 134.
142. 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 139, at 19, n.14.
143. Kuc, supra note 130, at 451.
144. Id. at 466.
145. See Trail & Allen, supra note 134, at 244 (“These four areas of medicine were selected
because they are high risk areas of medicine . . . .”); 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 139, at 8–9
(“The respective specialty committees used malpractice insurers’ claims data to identify the
medical procedures that lead to malpractice claims, and adopted guidelines that cover these
procedures.”).
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in the project (the cardiologists, for example, refused),146 and the existence
of guidelines issued by their national organizations.147
Three features of the Maine legislation illustrate the degree to which it
represented capture of the standard of care by the state’s medical
profession.148 First, physicians controlled the process by which the specialty
guidelines were created.149 Second, the guidelines were adopted as
146. See 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 139, at 8 (“Inclusion of cardiology was considered,
but physicians in this specialty decided not to participate.”). At least fifty percent of the
physicians in each specialty had to agree to participate in the demonstration project in order for
the specialty to be included. Id. at 27.
147. See Trail & Allen, supra note 134, at 244 (“These four areas of medicine were selected
because they are high risk areas of medicine that, for the most part, already operated under
guidelines created on a national level.”); Begel, supra note 141, at 78–79 (“The guidelines
referenced and adopted into the Maine statute are comprised of revised versions of the national
standards of three medical specialties and their respective national organizations—the American
Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA), the American College of Radiology (ACR), and the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG). In addition, a group of
emergency room physicians created their own protocols regarding: (1) cervical spine x-rays for
acute trauma patients, (2) documentation of instructions to patients upon discharge, and (3)
transferring patients pursuant to the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986
(C.O.B.R.A.).”); 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 139, at 9 (“The guidelines adopted by the
specialty committees are either drawn from guidelines written by national specialty societies or
written by the committees themselves. For example, nationally developed guidelines include
those pertaining to caesarean delivery for failure to progress and performance of a screening
mammography. Committee-developed guidelines include those pertaining to cervical-spine X
rays and preoperative testing for anesthesia.”). In 1991, a fourth specialty group, radiology, was
added. See id. at 38–39 (“Radiology was not included in the original legislation that established
the demonstration project. Maine radiologists subsequently asked the Board of Registration in
Medicine for inclusion in the project because they wanted to address the problems they
perceived with increasing health care costs and increasing numbers of malpractice claims.
Legislation enacted in June 1991 added radiology as a participating specialty in the
demonstration project.”).
148. Notwithstanding the unprecedented nature of the Maine legislation, Begel states that
“[t]he final version of the project was adopted by the Legislature in the early morning hours of
the closing 1990 legislative session and was the subject of little discussion.” Begel, supra note
141, at 76–77.
149. Each specialty group formed an advisory committee. As Gary Kuc explains, “[t]he
Advisory Committees formulated draft versions of the practice parameters and sent them for
comments to all physicians in Maine practicing in the respective specialty areas. On February
14, 1991, pursuant to the rulemaking requirements of the Maine Administrative Procedure Act,
the Board of Registration in Medicine (Board) held public hearings on the preliminary drafts of
the parameters. The Board considered written commentary to clarify technical language in the
practice parameters and the requirements for eligibility for participation in the Project. Except
for the chairpersons of the Advisory Committees, who spoke in favor of adopting the practice
parameters as administrative rules, no other parties spoke either for or against the practice
parameters.” Kuc, supra note 130, at 457. The number of physicians involved, moreover, was
quite small; according to Gordon Smith, lawyer for Maine Medical Association, the Maine
project was feasible because of special conditions: “Maine has fewer than 100 doctors in three
of the four specialties involved, so it is actually possible to have a meeting, for example, with
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administrative rules by the state medical board, meaning that once they
were approved, plaintiffs could not challenge their substance, for example,
as substandard.150 This differentiated the medical guidelines from other
industry standards, which are admissible as evidence of the standard of care,
but not dispositive.151 Third, the legislation provided that the guidelines
could be used only as a shield to protect physicians from liability; plaintiffs
could not use a physician’s failure to comply as evidence of malpractice. 152
According to Arnold Rosoff, the one-sided approach was necessary in order
to obtain the cooperation of the medical professionals.153
While the Maine demonstration project was undertaken on behalf of the
medical profession, it had some support within the legal academy.
Havighurst wrote an article in 1991 in which he posited that “guidelines
might provide a degree of protection against malpractice suits premised on
the omission of an arguably beneficial diagnostic test or therapy,” 154 and
every anesthesiologist in the state.” RAND INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CONFERENCE
PROCEEDINGS: HEALTH CARE DELIVERY AND TORT: SYSTEMS ON COLLISION COURSE? 71
(Elizabeth Rolph ed., 1991) [hereinafter RAND REPORT].
150. See Kuc, supra note 130, at 457–58 (“At the conclusion of the rulemaking process, the
Board adopted the practice parameters as administrative rules, thereby giving them the force and
effect of law.”).
151. See Mello, supra note 61, at 660–61 (“The state courts vary in their approaches to the
admissibility of industry codes and standards. A large number of cases support the view that
such codes and standards are admissible, probative evidence on the issue of the defendant’s
duty. Since such codes are believed to be ‘objective standards representing a consensus of
opinion carrying the approval of a significant segment of an industry,’ they are deemed to
‘contain the elements of trustworthiness and necessity which justify an exception to the hearsay
rule.’ Courts that admit written industry standards generally require an expert to testify as to the
standards’ acceptance in the industry. Moreover, compliance or noncom-pliance [sic] with the
written standards is not viewed as conclusive evidence of negligence, or the absence thereof,
only as some evidence of it. The rationale is that while the standards indicate the prevailing
thinking in the industry about the appropriate level of precautions, and in some cases may
codify industry custom, they do not rise to the level of substantive law. Violating an industry
safety standard, therefore, is not the same thing as violating a statute, which may give rise to an
inference of per se negligence. A few courts have declined to afford written industry standards
even this degree of weight; they have opted to make such standards inadmissible even when
expert authentication is proffered.”).
152. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2975(1) (repealed 1999) (“In any claim for professional
negligence against a physician or the employer of a physician . . . in which a violation of a
standard of care is alleged, only the physician or the physician’s employer may introduce into
evidence, as an affirmative defense, the existence of the practice parameters and risk
management protocols developed and adopted pursuant to [the law] for that medical specialty
area.”).
153. See Rosoff, supra note 9, at 344 (“This uneven application of CPGs has come about as
a political barter, with legislators assuring physicians, in effect, that if they will support the
development and adoption of guidelines, those guidelines cannot be turned against them in
litigation.”) (citation omitted).
154. Havighurst, supra note 130, at 783.
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therefore “there would be less reason for physicians, fearing liability for
malpractice, to practice ‘defensive medicine’ . . . .”155 However, Havighurst
did not believe that physicians should be allowed to establish their own
standard of care but rather that it should be negotiated as part of a
contractual agreement with their patients.156 Up-and-coming law professor
Mark Hall published an article in 1991 in which he argued that “[p]ractice
policies would help close the gap between theory and practice by using
authoritative statements of existing practice to remove the factual
uncertainty that presently surrounds the determination of whether some
given practices are acceptable.”157 Hall preferred for guidelines to be
irrebutable evidence of the standard of care, but he acknowledged that they
might not be sufficiently “definite” to be entitled to conclusive effect. 158
Instead, therefore, he advocated a “variable immunity statute” in which a
trial judge would be authorized to issue directed verdicts for defendants
only if the judge considered the guideline proffered by the defendant to be
sufficiently “authoritative” and applicable to the facts.159 Unlike the Maine
legislation, Hall would allow plaintiffs to use a defendant’s failure to
comply with a guideline as evidence of negligence, but similar to the Maine
program, under Hall’s approach a guideline could be conclusive evidence
only if it were introduced by the defendant.160
Along with Maine, Vermont, and Florida, Minnesota also enacted
legislation in the early 1990s authorizing the creation of state-sanctioned
practice guidelines and their use in malpractice cases. Like Maine,
Minnesota provided for one-sided adherence to a guideline as an absolute
defense to liability.161 The Minnesota program went even further than
Maine’s; in fact, it authorized the state health commissioner to adopt
guidelines promulgated by the AMA, a specialty group that was a member
155. Id. at 798. For a discussion of defensive medicine, see infra text accompanying notes
151–55.
156. E-mail from Clark Havighurst to author (December 11, 2011) (on file with author), in
which he states that “I don’t recall any significant direct contacts with the folks in Maine,
although I believe I talked with them on the phone. I’d published a fair amount on guidelines
before 1990, but I’d guess they got their main idea from AMA or other medical sources. My
idea was always that we shouldn’t let the medical profession alone lay down the guidelines (I
had lots of contact with the AMA’s point person on guidelines but can’t remember his name)
and that contracts might specify such things as the standard of care.”
157. Hall, supra note 105, at 130.
158. Id. at 133 (“The lack of support for giving [practice guidelines] conclusive effect may
be due, in large measure, then, to the absence of sufficiently definite standards.”).
159. Id. at 135.
160. Id. at 131.
161. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62J (West 1993); Hyams, Shapiro & Brennan, supra note 5,
at 307 (“Evidence of a departure from a practice parameter is admissible only on the issue of
whether the provider is entitled to an absolute defense.”) (citation omitted).
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of the American Board of Medical Specialties, or a similar “national health
professional board or association,” without going through the rulemaking
process at all, and it made adherence to the guidelines an “absolute defense”
for physicians.162 Vermont took a less pro-physician approach than either
Maine or Minnesota; guidelines would merely serve as expert opinion,
rather than an affirmative defense, and both plaintiffs and defendants could
introduce guidelines as evidence of the standard of care.163 Florida
authorized physicians to use compliance with guidelines designated by the
Florida Agency for Health Care Administration as an “affirmative
defense.”164 Although one group of commentators states that the intent of
the legislation was to make use of guidelines a one-way street for
defendants, as had the laws in Minnesota and Maine, other commentators
point out that, since the Florida law was silent on whether guidelines also
could be used by plaintiffs, there was concern that the legislation actually
could increase physicians’ malpractice exposure.165
At the federal level, bills were introduced in 1991 by Senator Pete
Domenici (R-N.M.),166 and in 1993 by Alex McMillan (R-N.C.), Nancy
Johnson (R-Conn.),167 and Senator William Cohen (R-Me.).168 Although
most of the enthusiasm came from Republican legislators, Hyams and his
162. See Rosoff, supra note 9, at 340. Rosoff calls the Minnesota approach, which he
describes as treating adherence to a guideline as an irrebutable presumption that the physician
followed the standard of care, “the most extreme” possible. Id. Minnesota delegated guideline
setting to the commissioner of health, with advice from a committee composed of health care
professionals and representatives from the research community and the medical technology
industry, and from a “Health Care Analysis Unit” within the state health department. Hyams,
Shapiro & Brennan, supra note 5, at 306. Minnesota regulators had planned to start with
guidelines issued by the AHCPR for treating low back pain and unstable angina. Id. at 307.
163. See 1991 Vt. Acts 160 [adjourned session], § 46; Trail & Allen, supra note 134, at 248
(“Type II guidelines may be challenged like any other evidence offered to establish the standard
of care. Physician compliance with these guidelines does not create an affirmative defense. The
guidelines function as expert testimony concerning the standard of care. Vermont created a
Type II practice guidelines program with health care reform legislation in 1992. The program,
implemented in 1994, allows the guideline to be admitted as evidence of the standard of care by
either the plaintiff or the defendant.”).
164. See FLA. STAT. § 408.02 (2000) (repealed 2004); Hyams, Shapiro & Brennan, supra
note 5, at 307–08.
165. Trail & Allen, supra note 134, at 244.
166. Domenici’s bill, the Medical Injury Compensation Fairness Act, “encouraged the
development of medical practice guidelines to determine appropriate standards of care.” Hyams,
Shapiro & Brennan, supra note 5, at 308.
167. McMillan and Johnson introduced H.R. 1969 and H.R. 1625 respectively; both would
have allowed AHCPR and state-developed guidelines as affirmative defenses to medical
malpractice. Id.
168. Cohen “proposed a national ‘Maine-model’ to treat AHCPR guidelines as ‘rebuttable
evidence’ in court.” Id. (citation omitted).
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colleagues describe how “[d]uring the 1992 presidential debates, thencandidate Bill Clinton stated, ‘I think you have to help doctors stop
practicing defensive medicine. I’ve recommended that our doctors be given
a set of national practice guidelines and if they follow these guidelines, it
raises a presumption that they didn’t do anything wrong.’”169 Section 5312
of the October 27, 1993, draft of President Clinton’s American Health
Security Act would have established a pilot program at the state level in
which compliance with guidelines would be a “complete defense” to
liability.170 A Republican counter-proposal by Senator John Chafee (R-R.I.)
and Representative William Thomas (R-Cal.) would have required states to
develop guidelines and made adherence to them a rebuttable presumption
that the doctor met the standard of care,171 while the health reform plan put
forward by Senator John Breaux (D-La.) and Representative James Cooper
(D-Tenn.) would have given grants to the states to develop guidelines
without dictating what weight they should be given in malpractice cases. 172
In addition, a little-known provision in the Medicare laws authorized Peer
Review Organizations—private contractors who performed quality
assurance duties—to “apply” “professionally developed norms of care and
treatment” and immunized physicians who complied with the norms from

169. Id. at 308–09.
170. Id. at 309. See also Ayres, supra note 61, at 422 (“Proposed federal legislation would
apply practice parameters as the standard of care in an alternative dispute resolution system.”);
Rosoff, supra note 9, at 340 (describing Republican proposals in 1993); 1993 GAO REPORT,
supra note 139, at 1–2 (“In its recent health care reform plan, the Clinton Administration
proposed a medical liability pilot program based on practice guidelines developed by the
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research within the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services. Under the pilot program, physicians able to demonstrate that their professional
conduct or treatment complied with appropriate practice guidelines would not be liable for
medical malpractice.”).
171. Hyams, Shapiro & Brennan, supra note 5, at 309. See also Rosoff, supra note 9, at 340
(“A less prescriptive approach would be to treat compliance with a relevant guideline as raising
a rebuttable presumption that the physician acted correctly; similarly, noncompliance would
raise a rebuttable presumption that the physician acted negligently. Whichever party asserted the
guideline, the opposing party could attempt to counter this presumption by appropriate
evidence. This was the approach contemplated in the Health Equity and Access Reform Today
(HEART) bill, proposed by Senator John Chafee (R-R.I.) and others in 1993. (S. 1770, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 4025 [1993]). Under HEART, adherence to state-developed guidelines which
had been certified by the secretary of Health and Human Services would raise a rebuttable
presumption of appropriate care that would be overcome only by ‘clear and convincing
evidence,’ a stricter than normal evidentiary standard favoring the party complying with the
guideline.”).
172. Hyams, Shapiro & Brennan, supra note 5, at 309–10. The Cooper-Breaux bill (H.R.
3222/S. 1579) provided that the resulting guidelines “may be applied to resolve” cases. Id.
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civil liability, although the law went on to say that the physician would be
immunized only if he “exercised due care.”173
None of these efforts amounted to anything, however. The Peer Review
Organization immunity provision has not been invoked in any reported
case. The national health reform efforts of the 1990s came to naught. More
importantly, none of the state programs were successful.174 Neither
Minnesota nor Florida appears to have issued any guidelines,175 and the
project in Vermont seems to have been abandoned.176 The Maine project ran
into interference from another malpractice reform that the state legislature
had adopted in 1985,177 a requirement that complaints be submitted to
pretrial screening and mediation panels. As a result, a defendant wishing to
assert an affirmative defense of adherence to a guideline would have to raise
it at the pretrial screening stage.178 The problem was that, under the pretrial
screening law, if a panel unanimously rejected the defense because it
concluded that the physician had failed to comply with the guideline, then
that finding had to be made known to the jury.179 In other words, despite the
intent of the legislature to restrict the benefit of guidelines to defendants, a
screening panel’s refusal to accept a guideline defense could be used
offensively by the plaintiff as evidence of negligence. The only way to
173. This law remains in effect today, and now applies to norms “applied” by Quality
Improvement Organizations, the successors to the Peer Review Organizations. See Social
Security Act § 1157(c), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-6(c) (West 2012). In 1991, Hall explained that the
immunity provision had never been asserted by a defendant because the Peer Review
Organizations had not promulgated any suitable “norms” and because of the “due care”
requirement. Hall, supra note 105, at 137–38.
174. Mello and Kachalia state that the limited experimentation in several states during the
early 1990s was not designed to facilitate a meaningful evaluation. Allen Kachalia & Michelle
Mello, New Directions in Medical Liability Reform, 364 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1564, 1570 (2011).
However, there clearly were efforts at least under the Maine program to evaluate the impact on
physicians’ malpractice costs. See infra text accompanying notes 184–88, 197–99.
175. See Hyams, Shapiro & Brennan, supra note 5, at 308 (“As of the beginning of May
1994, Florida has not adopted practice parameters for use in the demonstration project.”); Trail
& Allen, supra note 134, at 247 (“As of March 1995, no guidelines had been approved in
Minnesota.”).
176. See Mark Crane, Clinical Guidelines: A Malpractice Safety Net?, 76 MED. EC. 243
(1999) (“Similar experiments in Florida, Minnesota, and Vermont have been either repealed or
abandoned”). A 2005 report by a Vermont Malpractice Study Committee to the Vermont
General Assembly discusses the Maine program but makes no mention of Vermont’s. VERMONT
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE STUDY COMMITTEE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LIABILITY INSURANCE IN
VERMONT (2005), available at http://www.dfr.vermont.gov/sites/default/files/MedMal-finalreport%20(2).pdf [hereinafter VERMONT REPORT].
177. See the legislative history of ME. REV. STAT. tit. 24, § 2975(1), available at
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/statutes/24/title24ch21-1.pdf.
178. See Begel, supra note 141, at 81–82.
179. Id. at 86.
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avoid this risk would be for the doctor to refrain from asserting the
guideline as a defense, and since only once did a physician in Maine assert
adherence to a guideline as a defense,180 evidently most defendants decided
to take this more cautious approach.181 Additionally, a guideline defense in
Maine was not absolute. The plaintiff could rebut it by showing that the
guidelines in fact did not apply to the case in question, or that the physician
in fact had not adhered to it.182 As Hall acknowledged, in short, adherence to
a guideline “appears to provide only an additional piece of evidence for the
jury to consider . . . .”183 Not only was there little use of the guideline
defense in Maine, but there is no evidence that the project significantly
lowered malpractice insurance premiums or health care costs.184 Skepticism
180. See Rosoff, supra note 9, at 343.
181. See Begel, supra note 141, at 82 (describing how the panel would review a guideline
defense); Hyams, Shapiro & Brennan, supra note 5, at 306 (“The Demonstration Project’s
interface with the operations of the Maine prelitigation screening panels appears to have been
designed as an afterthought, and the screening panel operations may undermine the prohibition
on plaintiffs’ use of demonstration guidelines. For instance, if the guideline affirmative defense
is raised before the screening panel and the panel unanimously rejects it, then the trial court may
have to admit this ‘unanimous’ finding, thus allowing inculpatory use of the guideline after
all.”) (citation omitted); Rosoff, supra note 9, at 343 (“The paucity of malpractice litigation in
Maine since the institution of the state’s CPG experiment is partly due to the fact that the same
law that authorized it [sic] also mandated prelitigation screening and mediation panels.”). As a
result of the pretrial screening requirement, malpractice attorneys informed the GAO that the
Maine guideline legislation was most likely to affect litigation at the pretrial stage, since “in
cases involving areas of practice covered by the guidelines, attorneys expect that a decision by
the panel that the guidelines cover the claim and that the physician followed the guidelines and
was, therefore, within the applicable standard of care, will discourage plaintiffs from pursuing
their claims to trial.” 1993 GAO REPORT, supra note 139, at 19–20. However, the GAO reported
that, as of September 1993, “there were no examples of the guidelines having affected
malpractice litigation.” Id. at 19.
182. See Kuc, supra note 130, at 441 (“Although the physician may proffer the parameters
as evidence, once the court admits them, the plaintiff may present evidence on the issue of
compliance . . . .”); Trail & Allen, supra note 134, at 245 (“[I]f a doctor relies on the Ob/Gyn
guidelines and the plaintiff can prove those are not the appropriate standards for that particular
case, then the affirmative defense is not available. The plaintiff could provide such proof in one
of two ways. First, the plaintiff could prove the case is not an Ob/Gyn case. A second argument
would concede that the case is an Ob/Gyn case, but that the guidelines do not cover the
particular treatment or scenario as presented in the plaintiff’s cause of action.”).
183. Hall, supra note 105, at 135.
184. Rosoff cites a report that physicians performed fewer procedures out of fear of
liability, and a 1994 estimate by the state’s superintendent of insurance that the legislation
would reduce premiums by .5%. Rosoff, supra note 9, at 343. Trail and Allen give the .5%
estimate as a fact, and based on it and a comment by the Maine Medical Association that
“‘people believe’[sic] that doctors are performing fewer medical procedures because of the
guidelines,” they predicted that “significant savings should be calculable in the future.” Trail &
Allen, supra note 134, at 257. However, Rosoff cites a Bureau of Insurance report “that it
cannot distinguish the impact of the experiment from other factors affecting medical
professional liability claim costs and premiums.” Rosoff, supra note 9, at 343. A 2005 report to
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about the usefulness of guidelines in protecting physicians led the Maryland
legislature in 1993 to create a program to encourage the development of
practice guidelines but that prohibited their use by any party as evidence in
malpractice cases.185
What explains the failure of efforts in the early 1990s to allow practice
guidelines to play a major role in malpractice litigation? In the case of
federal legislation, the proposals had been hitched to national health reform,
and they stalled when it did. The program in Maine, as noted earlier, was
encumbered by other malpractice reform legislation.186 In addition, although
medical groups had instigated or supported the efforts, the AMA itself was
not, as yet, enthusiastic.187 In the first place, its leaders feared that
government and private payers would issue guidelines that were aimed at
saving money rather than articulating appropriate standards of care, so that
James Todd, then the president of the AMA, declared in 1989 that “what we
have to avoid is developing parameters based on economic considerations.
That’s where the push is coming from the federal government.
Effectiveness, appropriateness, necessity—to the federal government those
are euphemisms for cost control and rationing.”188
Moreover, the AMA was worried that guidelines would usher in an era
of “cookbook medicine” in which forces beyond its control would use them
to decrease physician discretion. Said Todd:
You cannot restrict physicians to one procedure or series of
procedures for a specific condition. . . . No two patients are exactly
alike and no two conditions are exactly alike. What we must do is
provide physicians with parameters that give them the flexibility
to utilize their own skills within an acceptable range of options.189

the Vermont legislature states that “[i]n 2000, the Maine Superintendent of Insurance, issued an
order finding that the medical malpractice professional liability cost savings attributed to the
Medical Liability Demonstration Project was zero percent.” VERMONT REPORT, supra note 176,
at 77.
185. Trail & Allen, supra note 134, at 248 (“The Maryland program, initiated on April 13,
1993, ‘mandates the development of state guidelines but explicitly prohibits introduction [of the
guidelines] as evidence by any party in a malpractice suit’.”). Rosoff states that “a 1995
Maryland statute enacted to encourage guidelines development provided that CPGs developed
under the program it established could not be used in litigation (Md. Code Ann. [Health-Gen.]
Section 19-606), a restriction that has since been removed from the legislation.” Rosoff, supra
note 9, at 335.
186. See supra notes 177–78 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 161–67 and accompanying text.
188. James S. Todd, Only Parameters Will Give MDs Needed Flexibility, AMERICAN MED.
NEWS, Jan. 6, 1989, at 15.
189. Id. Trail and Allen agree: “[P]ractice guidelines establish a general standard of
good/proper care and doctors should be able to deviate without penalty if that is what the
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The AMA therefore pushed for guidelines to include “a disclaimer stating
that they are not intended to displace the physician’s discretion to conform
treatment to the particular clinical circumstances of the individual
patient,”190 which prompted Hall to complain that it renders guidelines
“entirely advisory or equivocal by waffling phrases and general
disclaimers,” and “deprives them of any relevance to malpractice
litigation.”191 The AMA also wanted guidelines to play only a limited role in
malpractice cases. In 1993, AMA attorney Edward Hirshfeld issued the
following statement:
The American Medical Association opposes, for the present at
least, direct adoption of CPGs [clinical practice guidelines] as a
legal standard and urges instead that they be used only as evidence
of the customarily observed professional standard of practice and
that their degree of authority be dependent upon the degree of their
acceptance among medical practitioners.192

The AMA was even unwilling to support making adherence to guidelines an
affirmative defense to malpractice liability.193
III.

THE REVIVAL OF PRACTICE GUIDELINES ON THE POLITICAL SCENE

Despite the failure of the initiatives in the 1990s, the idea that practice
guidelines should serve as safe harbors recently has been revived by the
Obama administration. The main reason for the Administration’s current
interest in practice guidelines was President Obama’s efforts to obtain the
backing of organized medicine for his health reform plan.194 Senator Max
Baucus (D-Mont.), chair of the Senate Finance Committee, held discussions
prudent doctor would do in that situation. The ability to deviate under unusual circumstances
without penalty is a necessity for proper use of medical practice guidelines. Otherwise, the
claims of ‘cookbook medicine’ would come to fruition.” Trail & Allen, supra note 134, at 246–
47.
190. Hall, supra note 105, at 144.
191. Id. at 143–44.
192. Rosoff, supra note 9, at 340–41.
193. Id. at 341. The profession also probably feared that states would not follow Maine’s
attempt to bar plaintiffs from using a failure to follow a guideline to inculpate a physician,
which was borne out by the legislation in Vermont and Florida.
194. There had been some continued discussion in academic circles about the idea of using
practice guidelines as defenses to malpractice after the debacle in the 1990s, but no consensus.
Compare Rosoff, supra note 9, at 366 (who favored allowing government certification of
guidelines “to introduce guidelines more prominently into the legal process and help courts
decide which guidelines should be regarded as authoritative”), with Mello, supra note 61, at
708–09 (who felt that “increased reliance on clinical practice guidelines to establish the standard
of care in medical malpractice cases would be undesirable”).
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in 2009 on the “safe harbor” idea.195 In May 2009, the President met with
incoming AMA president J. James Rohack, and told him that the
Administration was willing to offer liability protection to physicians who
followed practice guidelines.196 While as discussed earlier, the AMA had
balked at the idea back in the 1990s,197 the organization was now eager to
cooperate. Likely, it viewed the safe harbors scheme as the most it could
get, since the Democrats were unwilling to support the AMA’s top
legislative priority, a federal cap on damages.198 The AMA leadership also
was worried that physicians would face pressure from the government and
other third-party payers to adhere to guidelines aimed at cutting costs,
making them vulnerable to malpractice liability if the guideline
recommendations conflicted with what was thought to be the prevailing
standard of care. “If everyone is focused on saying, ‘How do we get rid of
unnecessary costs,’” Rohack remembers saying to President Obama, “if we
as physicians are going to say, ‘Here’s our guidelines, we will follow them,’
then we need to have some protections.”199 “[The President] listened,” says
Rohack, and then replied: “Clearly, that concept is worthy of discussion.”200
Accordingly, on September 9, 2009, President Obama made the following
statement to a joint session of Congress in which he outlined his health
reform initiative:
I have talked to enough doctors to know that defensive medicine
may be contributing to unnecessary costs. So I am proposing that
we move forward on a range of ideas about how to put patient
safety first and let doctors focus on practicing medicine. I know
that the Bush Administration considered authorizing
demonstration projects in individual states to test these issues. It’s
a good idea, and I am directing my Secretary of Health and
Human Services to move forward on this initiative today.201

195. Ronen Avraham, President Obama’s First Two Years: A Legal Reflection: Private
Regulation, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 543, 575 (2011).
196. Id.; Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Open to Reining in Medical Suits,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2009, at A1.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 192–93.
198. See Stolberg & Pear, supra note 196 (“the A.M.A.’s highest legislative priority is
capping jury awards, highly unlikely under the Obama administration”).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. President Barack Obama, Health Care Speech to Congress (Sept. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/us/politics/10obama.text.html?pagewanted=1&%2360;!-Undefined%20dynamic%20function%20data_sanitationlib::sanitize_string:1%20called--&%2
362.
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On June 11, 2010, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
(AHRQ) in the Department of Health and Human Services202 duly
announced that it had awarded a number of demonstration and planning
grants under the new health reform legislation, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA).203 The purpose of the grants, according to
AHRQ, was to test models that, among other things, “ensure that patients
are compensated in a fair and timely manner for medical injuries, while also
reducing the incidence of frivolous lawsuits; and . . . reduce liability
premiums.”204 One of the AHRQ planning grants, worth $299,458, was
given to Lynn Marie Crider of the Office for Oregon Health Policy and
Research (OHPR) to “develop and implement a method for setting priorities
for developing evidence-based practice guidelines, craft a broadly supported
safe harbor legislative proposal that will define the legal standard of care,
and develop a plan to evaluate the effectiveness of the legislative proposal,
if enacted.”205 According to an OHPR job posting for a student researcher,
202. This was the name adopted by Congress in 1999 for what previously had been called
the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research when it lost its authority to “arrange for” the
issuance of practice guidelines due to opposition from physicians. See Avraham, supra note
195, at 576–78.
203. Press Release, Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research, HHS Announces Patient
Safety and Medical Liability Demonstration Projects (June 11, 2010), http://www.ahrq.gov/
news/press/pr2010/hhsliabawpr.htm (hereinafter “AHRQ Press Release”).
204. Id.
205. Medical Liability Reform and Patient Safety, Planning Grants (June 2010),
http://www.ahrq.gov/qual/liability/planninggrants.htm. PPACA states that demonstration grants
must “not conflict with State law at the time of the application in a way that would prohibit the
adoption of an alternative to current tort litigation . . . .” 42 U.S.C.A. § 280g (West 2012),
amended by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 10607, adding § 399V-4(c)(2)(H).
Therefore, the Oregon grant was in the form of a planning rather than a demonstration grant
because implementing its proposal would require legislative changes to medical liability rules.
Randall R. Bovbjerg, Will the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Address the Problems
Associated with Medical Malpractice?, URBAN INSTITUTE, http://www.rwjf.org/files/research/
67188malpractice.pdf (2010). In awarding planning grants, PPACA instructs the Department of
Health and Human Services, of which the AHRQ is a part, to “give preference to those States in
which State law at the time of the application would not prohibit the adoption of an alternative
to current tort litigation,” 42 U.S.C. § 399V-4(i). However, this section also states that the
planning grant must be for a demonstration project that meets the criteria for a demonstration
grant. Id. If the project would require a change in state law, it therefore appears that it could not
be funded by a PPACA demonstration grant following the planning grant phase. Furthermore,
PPACA demonstration projects must provide patients “the ability to opt out of or voluntarily
withdraw from participating in the alternative at any time and to pursue other options, including
litigation, outside the alternative . . . .” § 399V-4(c)(2)(G). It is unlikely that a safe-harbors
demonstration project could meet the opt-out requirement in any meaningful way, however.
Most likely, the demonstration project would employ the same approach as the birth-related
injury compensation programs adopted in Virginia and Florida in the late 1980s. These
programs substituted for the malpractice system a workers-compensation-like administrative
system to compensate victims for a narrow range of birth-related injuries. The enabling

44:1165]

PROFESSIONAL POWER

1205

the project will “explore a method for adopting evidence-based guidelines
to address the clinical situations that result in significant numbers of patient
injuries or medical liability claims.”206 To “reduce medical liability claims,”
the project will explore “linking the legal standard of care to compliance
with the guidelines,” the job description continues, in order to “provide
physicians with greater clarity about the standard of care expected of them
and assure them that, if they adhere to the guidelines, they will not be found
liable for harm resulting from failure to do something that is inconsistent
with the guidelines.”207 The failed experiments of the 1990s, in short, were
to be tried again.
This time, however, the backers of the safe harbors initiative are
confident of success because they plan to use new and improved guidelines
that are “evidence-based,”208 that is, guidelines that are based on
“impartial,” “rigorous” analysis of evidence from “well-designed studies”
and from “deep clinical and scientific expertise.”209 The evidence itself is
expected to come from an expanded program of federally funded
comparative effectiveness research, another element of President Obama’s
health agenda. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(ARRA), for example, authorized the expenditure of $1.1 billion to conduct
research comparing “clinical outcomes, effectiveness, and appropriateness
of items, services, and procedures that are used to prevent, diagnose, or treat
diseases, disorders, and other health conditions.”210
legislation required that patients be given the opportunity to opt out by choosing a physician and
hospital that have chosen not to participate in the program, but since patients may not know in
advance whether the provider is participating, and since virtually all eligible providers have
chosen to participate, patients are unlikely to have any practical alternative. See Maxwell J.
Mehlman, Promoting Fairness in the Medical Malpractice System, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 137–53 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh, eds., 2006).
206. Overiew of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality’s Medical Liability
Reform and Patient Safety Planning Grant, http://cms.oregon.gov/oha/OHPR/grant/docs/
medliabgrantoverview_4.14.11.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2012).
207. Id.
208. David Eddy is said to have coined the term and to have been the first person to
produce a national guideline explicitly based on evidence. See David Eddy, Evidence-Based
Medicine: A Unified Approach, 24 HEALTH AFF. 9, 9 (2005).
209. Alan M. Garber, Evidence-Based Guidelines As a Foundation For Performance
Incentives, 24 HEALTH AFF. 174, 175 (2005).
210. M.C. Weinstein & J.A. Skinner, Comparative Effectiveness and Health Care
Spending: Implications for Reform, 326 N. ENG. J. MED. 460–65 (2010). ARRA also established
the Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research to foster optimum
coordination of comparative effectiveness research conducted or supported by federal
departments and agencies, while the 2010 health care reform legislation established the Center
for Comparative Effectiveness Research within AHRQ and an independent Comparative
Effectiveness Research Commission. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R 3590,
111th Cong., 2nd sess. (2010).
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Will this new guidelines initiative succeed? What does the failure of the
guidelines effort in the 1990s tell us about its chances of success? Is the safe
harbors concept sound scientifically? Can guidelines truly be “evidencebased”? Finally, would the increase in professional power represented by
the safe harbors approach be warranted?
IV.

THE WEAKNESSES OF THE EARLY GUIDELINES

Experts who were familiar with the practice guidelines that were
available in the early 1990s generally were not impressed. Guidelines were
pouring forth; the AMA had documented 1600 of them, issued by more than
sixty entities.211 But which ones were valid reflections of the standard of
care? Many of the guidelines made conflicting recommendations. The
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), a research agency created in
1972 to advise Congress on scientific technology, warned that “[i]f courts
and legislatures are not selective about which guidelines are introduced as
evidence, these conflicts may find their way into the courts and further
confuse rather than clarify the process of determining negligence.”212 One
solution put forward to deal with multiple guidelines that covered the same
subject was for courts to rely only on national guidelines, as Maine had
attempted to do in selecting the specialty subjects for its program, but
typically a number of national organizations were interested in a particular
area of medicine, and these organizations often disagreed about what
constituted proper care.213 Moreover, physicians and legislators were
concerned that reliance on national standards could ignore local differences
that could make the national standards overly burdensome and unrealistic. 214
The OTA, predicting that this might cause state and local groups to modify
national guidelines or to refuse to rely on them in programs such as
Maine’s, cautioned:
State guidelines initiatives such as these raise . . . the potential for
conflict between national, State, and even institutional [e.g.,
211. Trail & Allen, supra note 134, at 252.
212. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS ON MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE COSTS 33 (1993). Experts convened by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice
similarly worried that “the competition in guidelines . . . could generate confusion in
malpractice cases as to which guidelines are ‘better’ and should have been followed in the
treatment setting giving rise to the specific malpractice claim. Instead of clarifying the issues
regarding [the] standard of care in the malpractice suit, such competition between guidelines in
the courtroom could simply elevate ‘the battle of experts’ that often occurs to a ‘battle of
guidelines.’” RAND REPORT, supra note 149, at 58.
213. See Rosoff, supra note 9, at 345.
214. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 212, at 33.
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hospital] guidelines. Most of Maine’s guidelines were modeled
closely from nationally recognized standards, but others were
developed de novo by Maine physicians and could be construed as
setting a precedent for reconversion to a more local standard of
care. Developers of guidelines in Minnesota anticipate using
national guidelines as models and amending them if necessary to
conform to the realities of health care delivery in the State. In
Vermont, the statutory description of guidelines could be
interpreted as including even written institutional protocols.215

Concerned that national guidelines would impinge on the preferences of
local medical societies, however, the AMA “published a pamphlet to assist
local organizations with guideline modification processes.”216
Even if only one guideline covered a topic, physicians’ concern that
slavish adherence to the guideline would deprive them of their discretion to
adjust care to suit the needs of individual patients resulted in the inclusion
of loopholes and escape clauses. Hall lamented:
The difficulty encountered to date is that what might otherwise be
sufficiently precise guidelines are rendered entirely advisory or
equivocal by waffling phrases and general disclaimers. For
instance, the anesthesiology standards described previously call
for monitoring blood pressure and heart rate ‘at least every five
minutes,’ but, ‘under extenuating circumstances, the responsible
anesthesiologist may waive the requirement.’ These two
qualifications render the standard incapable of offering a definitive
statement of whether every five minutes is often enough or too
often.217

Built-in exceptions, which Hall blamed on what he called the “snowflake”
theory that no two patients or conditions were exactly alike, made relying
on a guideline to serve as the standard of care unworkable: “It is
impossible,” he pointed out, “for physicians to have both wide clinical
discretion and, at the same time, freedom from scrutiny in malpractice
litigation.”218
Another problem with the guidelines was that they could be biased by
the interests of the medical groups that issued them. One observer at the
time cautioned:

215. Id.
216. Ayres, supra note 61, at 429.
217. Hall, supra note 105, at 143. See also Begel, supra note 141, at 84 (“It is difficult to
imagine a set of facts upon which compliance with the anesthesiology protocol would resolve
all questions regarding compliance with the appropriate standard of care as a matter of law.”).
218. Hall, supra note 105, at 144.
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Physician specialists may realize economic gains when particular
guidelines are promulgated. Currently, most guidelines are drafted
by medical specialty organizations. To the extent that such
guidelines purport to require the expertise of a specialist, the basis
of such a requirement should be to assure high quality care, rather
than to confer an economic advantage.219

Other commentators pointed out that bias could be injected by differences
in viewpoint as well as economic self-interest:
The value of the various outcomes may differ significantly
depending on one’s perspective, and such differences may explain
differences in recommendations that have occurred. For example,
an organization dedicated to reducing harm from cancer may place
greater value on selected cancer screening interventions, even
though such interventions might prove to be extremely costly for
the magnitude of the benefit they provide. Another organization,
whose purpose is to promote the overall health of society, may
view the same evidence differently, preferring to concentrate on
other proven interventions with greater impact on overall public
health. Examples of this are the conflicting recommendations
among current breast cancer and prostate cancer screening
guidelines.220

The primary shortcoming of practice guidelines in the 1990s, however,
was the lack of scientific evidence supporting their recommendations,
without which guideline issuers were free to base them simply on bad
habits. A study found that one problem was the failure of the guideline
issuers to consult the evidence that was available:
Less than 10% of the guidelines used and described formal
methods of combining scientific evidence or expert opinion. Many
used informal techniques such as narrative summaries prepared by
clinical experts, a type of review shown to be of low mean
scientific quality and reproducibility. Indeed, it was difficult to
determine if some of the guidelines made any attempt to review
evidence, as less than 20% specified how evidence was identified,
and more than 25% did not even cite any references.221

219. Ayres, supra note 61, at 436.
220. Terrence M. Shaneyfelt, Michael F. Mayo-Smith & Jonathan Rothwangl, Are
Guidelines Following Guidelines? The Methodological Quality of Clinical Practice Guidelines
in the Peer-Reviewed Medical Literature, 281 JAMA 1900, 1904 (1999).
221. Id.
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The authors evaluated 279 guidelines on a wide variety of topics according
to twenty-five methodological standards222 and found that, in 1997, the
guidelines on average satisfied barely half of the standards.223
Even if a guideline at one time rested on a sound scientific foundation,
the evidence might well have changed, making the guideline no longer
valid. A 2001 study of the seventeen guidelines still in effect in 2000 out of
the nineteen guidelines that had been issued by the AHCPR between 1990
and 1996 concluded that “more than three quarters need updating.”224 The
staleness problem is a symptom of an even deeper problem: the risk that by
freezing the standard of care, guidelines will discourage innovation. This
was another reason why the AMA refused to back the safe harbors
initiative. The AMA’s general counsel issued the following statement:
[A] substantial amount of uncertainty is inherent in the practice of
medicine, and the uncertainty often gives rise to differing points of
view about how to handle various types of clinical situations.
These differences tend to be resolved through research and, more
importantly, through experience in the practice of medicine.
Usually a consensus begins to form about an area of disagreement
based on cumulative research and the observations of physicians
about what methods for handling a clinical situation yield the best
results. There is some danger that the adoption of a given practice
parameter as the legal standard of care would interfere with this
evolutionary process. Physicians might disagree with a legally
adopted standard, or they might have an idea about a new way to
handle a problem, but would not feel free to test their beliefs with
research or in their practices. They would feel constrained to
follow the legal standard. That sense of restraint could make it
more difficult for new ideas to emerge, be tested, and be accepted
or rejected.225

222. The standards dealt with guideline format and development (ten standards),
identification and summary of evidence (ten standards), and formulation of recommendations
(five standards). Id. at 1901.
223. Id.
224. Paul G. Shekelle et al., Validity of the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
Clinical Practice Guidelines: How Quickly Do Guidelines Become Outdated?, 286 JAMA
1461, 1466 (2001). See also Avraham, supra note 195, at 568 (“A 2001 report assessed the
reliability of seventeen CPGs developed between 1990 and 1996 by the AHRQ and concluded
that thirteen were out of date with then current research. According to the study, approximately
$4 million per guideline was needed to adequately revise them through the AHRQ’s Evidence
Based Practice Center Program. Unfortunately, medical research does not follow a set schedule,
and agency guidelines can fall even further behind new developments in medicine.”).
225. Edward B. Hirshfeld, Should Practice Parameters Be the Standard of Care in
Malpractice Litigation?, 266 JAMA 2886, 2889 (1991).
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Given all these guideline deficiencies, in short, it is no surprise that, in
the 1990s, hopes that professional guidelines could control physicians’
standard of care were dashed. A report by the prestigious IOM in 1990
summarized the state of the art of practice guidelines development as
follows:
Most generally, the process of systematic development,
implementation, and evaluation of practice guidelines based on
rigorous clinical research and soundly generated professional
consensus, although progressing, has deficiencies in method,
scope, and substance. Conflicts in terminology and technique
characterize the field; they are notable for the confusion they
create and for what they reflect about differences in values,
experiences, and interests among different parties. Public and
private development activities are multiplying, but the means for
coordinating these efforts to resolve inconsistencies, fill in gaps,
track applications and results, and assess the soundness of
particular guidelines are limited. Disproportionately more
attention is paid to developing guidelines than to implementing or
evaluating them. Moreover, efforts to develop guidelines are
necessarily constrained by inadequacies in the quality and quantity
of scientific evidence on the effectiveness of many services.226

Accordingly, the IOM concluded, guidelines had a long way to go before
they would be capable of meeting the goals of their proponents:
Today the field of guidelines development is a confusing mix of
high expectations, competing organizations, conflicting
philosophies, and ill-defined or incompatible objectives. It suffers
from imperfect and incomplete scientific knowledge as well as
imperfect and uneven means of applying that knowledge. Despite
the good intentions of many involved parties, the enterprise lacks
clearly articulated goals, coherent structures, and credible
mechanisms for evaluating, improving, and coordinating
guidelines development to meet social needs for good-quality,
affordable health care.227

The fate of President Clinton’s effort to employ practice guidelines as a
defense to malpractice liability in his national health reform initiative bears
this out; the White House Task Force on Health Care Reform ended up
rejecting the idea, with the co-chair of the relevant working group observing
that “[t]here’s not a lot of evidence out there . . . .”228
226. IOM 1990 REPORT, supra note 8, at 6.
227. Id. at 15.
228. Hyams, Shapiro & Brennan, supra note 5, at 309.
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Twenty years later, how far has the development of guidelines
progressed? Have solutions been found to the problems that afflicted
guidelines in the 1990s? Has medicine found ways around the issues of lack
of uniformity, lack of specificity, bias, conflicts of interest, and most of all,
the dearth of scientific support? The answer, for the most part, is that it has
not.
V.

SHORTCOMINGS OF CURRENT PRACTICE GUIDELINES

The same weaknesses that doomed the guidelines initiative in the 1990s
continue to plague guidelines today. Many guidelines still make conflicting
recommendations.229 A 2009 article in the Journal of the American Medical
Association (JAMA) gives a good example:
Although unanimity is the rule in individual guidelines, it can be
strikingly absent when different guidelines are compared. The
debate as to whether low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C)
or apolipoprotein B (apoB) is a more powerful marker of the risk
of vascular disease illustrates that guideline groups may not just
disagree—they actually may contradict each other. For instance, in
the past 6 months, 4 reports have compared LDL-C and apoB,
with 2 supporting LDL-C over apoB and 2 in favor of apoB for
predicting cardiovascular risk. The 2 reports that favor LDL-C
state categorically that there is no published evidence allowing
apoB treatment targets to be established. The 2 that chose apoB
cite multiple studies supporting their position in favor of an apoB
target. Only one presents a complete, detailed, organized review
and analysis of the evidence including the technical accuracy and
reproducibility of the 2 measures.230

Another group of researchers that looked at guidelines for preventive care
found significant variability in screening recommendations:
The average number and range of lifetime screens [for cancer and
cardiovascular disease] varied by issuing entity. For example, a
healthy twenty-one-year-old woman who became sexually active
at age eighteen would have twenty-five screens for cervical cancer
during her lifetime if she followed American Cancer Society
guidelines, but she would have only fifteen screens if she followed
229. See Finlay A. McAlister et al., How Evidence-Based Are the Recommendations in
Evidence-Based Guidelines?, 4 PLOS MED. 1325, 1326 (2007) (“Unfortunately,
recommendations may differ between guidelines, leaving the clinician with a decision to make
about which guideline to follow.”).
230. Allan D. Sniderman & Curt D. Furberg, Why Guideline-Making Requires Reform, 301
JAMA 429, 430 (2009).
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the US Preventive Services Task Force guidelines.
Recommendations for prostate cancer were even more variable,
ranging from the opinion that there was insufficient evidence to
recommend for or against screening to a recommendation fifteen
screens over a patient’s lifetime. The variability was not confined
to the number of recommended lifetime screens. The population
for which screening was recommended also varied. For example,
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists calls for
screening all women over age forty-five for diabetes every three
years. The US Preventive Services Task Force guidelines call for
screening adults whose blood pressure is greater than 135/80 mm
Hg, without recommending how often screening should take place.
And the American Diabetes Association calls for all patients over
age forty-five, particularly those who are obese, to be screened
every three years.231

The researchers’ explanations for these deficiencies echo criticisms similar
to those that had been lodged against the earlier guideline efforts:
“Insufficient available evidence may be responsible for some of the
variability,” but “[b]iases on the part of authors and too great a reliance on
expert opinion where evidence is lacking may also contribute.”232 Bias
stems partly from the lack of rules about the range of expertise and
viewpoints that must be employed in the guideline-writing process.233 But
bias also is attributable to the financial implications of guidelines for
different specialties.234 As one research group observes, “[b]y favoring one
test over another, or one therapy over another, guidelines often create
commercial winners and losers, who cannot be disinterested in the result
and who therefore must be separated from the process.”235

231. Salomeh Keyhani et al., A New Independent Authority Is Needed to Issue National
Health Care Guidelines, 30 HEALTH AFF. 256, 259–60 (2011).
232. Id. at 261. It is perhaps not surprising that preventive care guidelines should be so
problematic “[g]iven that more than 500 CPGs exist just for preventive care across the lifespan .
. . .” John Fontanesi et al., A New Model of Adoption of Clinical Practice Guidelines, 13 J. PUB.
HEALTH MGMT. PRAC. 605, 605 (2007).
233. See Sniderman & Furberg, supra note 230, at 429.
234. See William G. Carnett, Clinical Practice Guidelines: A Tool to Improve Care, 16 J.
NURSING CARE QUALITY 60, 62 (2002) (“Those [guidelines] written by interdisciplinary,
collaborative groups such as the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) are
viewed as written to specifically benefit patient care and general health practices. Others,
however, are written by specialty societies that potentially could be focused on the ‘proper’ use
or indications/credentialing for invasive and income-generating procedures.”).
235. Sniderman & Furberg, supra note 230, at 430. See also Keyhani et al., supra note 231,
at 263 (linking bias to vague guidelines).
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In addition to professional biases, personal conflicts of interest continue
to corrupt the guideline issuance process.236 A study of the seventeen
cardiovascular guidelines issued most recently by the American College of
Cardiology and the American Heart Association showed that 277 of the 498
(56%) individuals who participated in the PG [practice guideline]
production process had a conflict of interest, most often as a consultant or
advisory board member, followed by research grants, honoraria/speakers
bureaus, and stock or other ownership.237 The investigators found that
chairs, co-chairs, and first authors of peer reviews had an even higher rate
(81%).238 This was particularly troublesome, the investigators pointed out,
“given the fact that many of the newest ACC/AHA guideline
recommendations are based more on expert opinion than on clinical trial
data.”239 Financial relationships with drug companies are especially
common sources of conflicts of interest. An investigation of guideline
panels by the prestigious journal Nature published in 2005 reported that
“one-third of authors declared financial links to relevant drug companies,
with around 70% of panels being affected. In one case, every member of the
panel had been paid by the company responsible for the drug that was
ultimately recommended.”240 Yet of the more than 200 guidelines the
journal examined, “[o]nly 90 contained details about individual authors’
conflicts of interest. Of those, just 31 were free of industry influence.” 241
The investigators warned that “these links with pharmaceutical companies
are more worrying than the financial conflicts known to plague clinical
trials and reviews, say public-health experts, because the guidelines have
such a direct effect on the drugs that doctors prescribe.”242
236. Timothy Stolzfus Jost, Oversight of Marketing Relationships Between Physicians and
the Drug and Device Industry: A Comparative Study, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 326, 327 (2010)
(“Conflicts of interest may even infect practice guidelines.”).
237. Todd B. Mendelson et al., Conflicts of Interest in Cardiovascular Clinical Practice
Guidelines, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 577, 578 (2011).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 579.
240. Rosie Taylor & Jim Giles, Cash Interests Taint Drug Advice, 437 NATURE 1070
(2005). See also Niteesh K. Choudhry, Henry Thomas Stelfox & Allan S. Detsky, Relationships
Between Authors of Clinical Practice Guidelines and the Pharmaceutical Industry, 287 JAMA
612, 612–17 (2002) (reporting conflicts based on financial relationships with drug companies).
241. Taylor & Giles, supra note 240, at 1070.
242. Id. Among the more notorious recent examples of conflicts of interest in the creation
of guidelines is a guideline published in a leading cardiology journal by the Screening for Heart
Attack Prevention and Education Task Force, composed of prominent cardiologists. The
publication of the guideline was paid for by a major drug company, the authors of the guideline
failed to adequately disclose their financial relationships, and the guideline was never subjected
to peer review. Mendelson et al., supra note 237, at 578–79. Another well-publicized incident
was the disagreement between the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) and the
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A fundamental impediment to conflict-free guidelines is the lack of
impartial funding for their creation. Even if commercial interests were
barred from sponsoring the guideline process directly, Timothy Jost points
out that they “play a major role in funding medical specialty societies and
even patient disease organizations.”243
In March of 2011, the Council of Medical Specialty Societies issued a
new code governing conflicts of interest, among other things, in the
production of practice guidelines.244 However, the code has several
disturbing loopholes. For example, it requires only that a majority of the
panelists and the chair, or at least one chair if there are co-chairs, “are free
of conflicts of interest relevant to the subject matter of the guideline”;245 as
Avraham scoffs, “[i]t is indeed disturbing to imagine an ethical code
requiring that only the majority of the judges sitting in a case not have
conflicts of interest.”246 The code also permits industry support of the
“overall mission-based activities” of the specialty society,247 which could
result in sufficient indirect pressure from industry to influence guideline
recommendations. Moreover, it remains to be seen if there are enough
experts who do not have industry conflicts to enable panels to produce
scientifically well-informed guidelines.248
Another weakness in the guideline process, as observed by one article, is
that disagreements within a guideline development panel tend to be papered
over:
Unanimity is not a natural component of science. Given the
number and complexity of issues reviewed and given that
scientific knowledge is at any moment incomplete, unanimity is
obviously a tactic, not a necessary result. Debate may have been

International Lyme and Associated Diseases Society (ILADS) over proper treatment for Lyme
disease. See Susan Ronn, In the Lymelight: Law and Clinical Practice Guidelines, 102 S. MED.
J. 626, 627 (2009).
243. Jost, supra note 236, at 332–33.
244. COUNCIL OF MED. SPECIALTY SOCIETIES, CODE FOR INTERACTIONS WITH COMPANIES
(2011).
245. Id. §§ 7.7–.8 at 21–22.
246. Avraham, supra note 195, at 583.
247. CODE FOR INTERACTIONS WITH COMPANIES, supra note 244 at § 7.3, p. 20 (annotation).
248. See Taylor & Giles, supra note 240, at 1071 (“[T]he bodies that produce guidelines
maintain that there just aren’t enough experts without conflicts of interest. Nathaniel Clark of
the American Diabetes Association estimates that three-quarters of members eligible to write
guidelines have industry links, and other organizations report a similar number.”). See also
Mendelson et al., supra note 237, at 580 (“It has been argued that excluding or limiting
individuals with COIs is unrealistic because there simply are not enough experts without
COIs.”) (citing David Van Wyck et al., Response to “Influence of Industry on Renal Guideline
Development”, 2 CLINICAL J. AM. SOC’Y NEPHROLOGY 13, 13–14 (2007)).
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brisk within the committee but usually all evidence has been
expunged from the final document.249

A greater deficiency in current guidelines, however, is the same major
shortcoming that stymied the guidelines movement in the 1990s: the lack of
scientific evidence backing up the recommendations. When the IOM
examined the state of the art of evidence-based medicine in 2009 in the
course of recommending a list of priorities for the comparativeeffectiveness research initiative funded under ARRA, for example, it found
that “less than half of all treatments delivered today are supported by
evidence.”250 As for existing practice guidelines, the IOM observed that
“[e]ven the most thoughtfully conceived and sophisticated practice
guidelines have inadequacies in their evidence base . . . .”251 The IOM then
gave some specifics:
A recent review of practice guidelines developed by the American
College of Cardiology and the American Heart Association found
that relatively few recommendations were based on high-quality
evidence—randomized controlled trials, for instance—and many
were based solely on expert opinion, individual case studies, or
standard of care. A similar study revealed that more than twothirds of recommendations contained in 51 guidelines for treating
lung cancer were not evidence-based.252

As stated earlier, however, guideline proponents are optimistic that the
new emphasis on evidence-based guidelines, facilitated by federal
investment in comparative effectiveness and other sophisticated clinical
research, will remedy prior shortcomings.253 Unfortunately, as the next
section explains, their optimism is misplaced.

249. Sniderman & Furberg, supra note 230, at 430.
250. INST. OF MED., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS
RESEARCH 30 (2009).
251. Id.
252. Id. (references omitted). See also Linda H. Harpole et al., Assessment of the Scope and
Quality of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Lung Cancer, 123 CHEST J. (SUPP.) 7S, 9S (2003)
(lack of evidence supporting lung cancer guidelines); McAlister et al., supra note 229, at 1328
(28% of cardiovascular guidelines supported by evidence); Pierluigi Tricoci et al., Scientific
Evidence Underlying the ACC/AHA Clinical Practice Guidelines, 301 JAMA 831, 835 (2009)
(lack of evidence supporting cardiology guidelines despite fact that cardiology “has a large pool
of research to draw on for its care recommendations”).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 208–10.
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THE FALSE PROMISE OF EVIDENCE-BASED GUIDELINES

The hope that guidelines can be “evidence-based” is illusory. In the first
place, there is no consensus on what makes a guideline evidence-based. The
authors of a 2009 JAMA article, for example, stated that disagreement
between guidelines about markers for the risk of vascular disease was not
surprising “given the failure to even agree on what constitutes evidence or
how that evidence should be graded.”254 A group of commentators agreed:
While it is easy to say that one should follow only those guidelines
that are ‘evidence based,’ very few guideline developers declare
their documents to be non–evidence based, and there is ambiguity
about what ‘evidence based’ really means in the context of
guidelines. The term may be interpreted differently depending on
who is referring to the guideline—the developer, who creates the
guidelines, or the clinician, who uses them. To their developers,
‘evidence-based guidelines’ are defined as those that incorporate a
systematic search for evidence, explicitly evaluate the quality of
that evidence, and then espouse recommendations based on the
best available evidence, even when that evidence is not high
quality. However, to clinicians, ‘evidence based’ is frequently
misinterpreted as meaning that the recommendations are based
solely on high-quality evidence (i.e., randomized clinical trials
[RCTs]).255

Even if there were general agreement on what counted as a valid
evidentiary basis for guidelines, it is not clear that the clinical trials from
which the evidence is supposed to be extracted are capable of providing the
necessary knowledge. The hope that the evidence will be free of bias and
conflicts of interest is undermined by the fact that the investigators who
conduct these studies are themselves subject to industry conflicts. 256
254. Sniderman & Furberg, supra note 230, at 430.
255. McAlister et al., supra note 229, at 1326. A 2008 critique in JAMA makes a similar
point: “Underlying the logic of EBM [evidence-based medicine] is the vague definition of what
qualifies as evidence-based standards. Who determines which practices to adopt and what
standards to use; how are the relative risks, benefits, and costs considered, weighed, and
reported? Organizations such as the Joint Commission, the National Quality Forum, the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality have
served as clearinghouses for the adoption of certain best practices. However, the methods are
not fully developed to determine when evidence is sufficiently strong, the feasibility in varying
contexts is sufficiently robust, the costs or risks are small enough to encourage physician
compliance, and recommendations are free of conflicts of interest.” Simon C. Mathews & Peter
J. Pronovost, Physician Autonomy and Informed Decision Making: Finding the Right Balance
for Patient Safety and Quality, 300 JAMA 2913, 2915 (2008).
256. Anna M. Sawka et al., Competing Interests in Development of Clinical Practice
Guidelines for Diabetes Management: Report from a Multidisciplinary Workshop, 1 J.
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Moreover, clinical trials often bear little resemblance to real-world
conditions or concerns. In one study, for example, the second most common
reason that the investigators cited for downgrading recommendations in the
supposedly evidence-based guidelines that they reviewed, a problem in 47%
of their sample, was “concerns about the clinical relevance of the RCT
[randomized controlled trial]—for example, the RCT reported the effect of
the recommended therapy on surrogate outcomes only (e.g., levels of
glucose, low-density lipoprotein cholesterol, or blood pressure) rather than
patient-centered outcomes such as death, myocardial infarction, or
stroke.”257 Beyond a disjuncture between the endpoints of experiments and
the real concerns of patients and physicians, the experience of the subjects
in clinical studies may not predict results in actual patient populations. “The
most frequent reason for downgrading RCT-based therapy
recommendations (64 [51%] of the 126 cases),” stated the same group of
researchers, “were concerns about the need to extrapolate from a highly
selected RCT population to the scenario and/or the target population
specified in the guideline.”258 For example, “the RCT was conducted to
answer a particular question in a restricted study population but was then
extrapolated in the guideline to justify using the tested intervention in a
related, but different, clinical scenario and/or in a more general
population.”259
Even if a guideline is based on a clinical trial that was conducted on the
relevant patient population, the results of the trial may not hold true for
specific patients. It is a truism of medicine that patients differ in how an
illness affects them (assuming that they actually have the same illness) and
in how they respond to treatments, based on factors such as their genetic
makeup, the way their bodies function, and environmental conditions that
researchers are only beginning to understand.260 Clinical trials often do not
take this into consideration,261 and therefore nor would guidelines which
were based upon them, with the result that recommendations in the
MULTIDISCIPLINARY HEALTHCARE 29, 33 (2008) (“[E]vidence-based approaches to developing
CPG recommendations were favored in CPG development by our group in hopes of minimizing
bias. Yet, the use of such approaches may not necessarily safeguard CPGs from the influence of
CIs, as primary research and its interpretation may be subject to potential influences of CIs. For
example, it has been reported in the literature that industry sponsorship of studies is associated
with pro-industry conclusions.”).
257. McAlister et al., supra note 229, at 1329.
258. Id. at 1328.
259. Id. at 1329.
260. See Carnett, supra note 234, at 65–66; John R. Hampton, Guidelines: For the
Obedience of Fools and the Guidance of Wise Men?, 3 CLINICAL MED. 279 (2003).
261. See Rosoff, supra note 9, at 347.

1218

ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Ariz. St. L.J.

guidelines would not necessarily comply with the standard of care for that
patient. In the words of one British author, “the fundamental aim of a
guideline is to get away from individualized treatment.”262 Furthermore,
clinical trials rarely take into account patient preferences.263 With clinical
trials largely deaf to the fact that some patients are more willing to take
greater risks for a potential benefit than other patients, guidelines based on
the outcomes of the trials therefore will fail to reflect a critical factor in
clinical decision-making.
The need to allow physicians the flexibility to tailor care for individual
patients continues to be a major limitation on the ability of guidelines to
establish the standard of care. Frequently, guidelines include loopholes in
order to enable clinicians to practice individualized medicine, and as noted
earlier, this makes adherence to the guideline essentially useless as a
defense to malpractice.264 Avraham makes this clear by acknowledging that
“doctors would be able to deviate from the guidelines if they have to. They
would do so with the knowledge that they would no longer be protected by
the [safe harbors] defense, but they would be no less protected than they are
currently.”265
262. Hampton, supra note 260, at 283. Hampton adds that “guidelines inappropriately
applied are the antithesis of the concept that a patient should be treated as an individual. We
therefore must ask ourselves whether a particular guideline makes sense in general, and sense
for each particular patient . . . .” Id. at 279. See also Jerome Groopman, Health Care: Who
Knows ‘Best’?, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/
archives/2010/feb/11/health-care-who-knows-best/?page=2 (quoting director of AHRQ that
clinical trials “often do not reflect the ‘real world’ of individual patients”).
263. An analysis in 1999 found that “[f]ew guidelines (21.5%) . . . discussed the role of
patient preferences in choosing among the various health care options. Given the increasing
appreciation of the importance of patient values in many clinical decisions, we believe this
factor has not been adequately addressed in guidelines to date.” Shaneyfelt et al., supra note
220, at 1904. See also Harpole et al., supra note 252, at 17S (need for guidelines to factor in
patient preferences); Pamela S. Hinds et al., Translating Psychosocial Research Findings into
Practice Guidelines, 33 J. NURSING ADMIN. 397, 397–98 (2003) (same); Jost, supra note 21, at
846 (importance of considering patient as unique).
264. See supra notes 190–91 and accompanying text. A prime example of such a loophole
is in the 1985 anesthesia guidelines that had such a salutary effect on the quality of patient care.
See supra note 138 and accompanying text. The irony is that the experts convened by the Rand
Institute for Civil Justice predicted that future guidelines would be unlikely to have the same
positive effect on physicians’ risk of liability: “[n]or will guidelines have a dramatic effect on
reducing exposure to liability for physicians who practice in conformity with guidelines. The
past experience with guidelines in the anesthesia field, which did result in reduced malpractice
claims and insurance premiums, is not likely to be replicated in other fields of medicine. These
guidelines were very basic and made specific recommendations upon which there was nearly
universal agreement. They were also specifically addressed at identifying and correcting
conduct that resulted in malpractice claims, which generally has not been the ostensible purpose
of most other guidelines to date.” RAND REPORT, supra note 149, at 58–59.
265. Avraham, supra note 130, at 37.
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Finally, the problem of guidelines becoming stale persists. Even if
evidence-based guidelines were valid at one point in time, they may no
longer be valid when a physician seeks to be guided by them or to employ
adherence to them as a defense.266 A good illustration of guideline
obsolescence is a 2010 study of the effect of using guidelines issued at
different times as measures of the appropriateness of percutaneous coronary
intervention (PCI).267 The guidelines classify patients into different classes,
which determine the appropriateness of giving them PCI.268 The authors
explain that practice guidelines issued in 2001 were in force between 2003
and 2004, but it was not until the guidelines were revised in 2005 that they
“most accurately capture the evidence available in 2003 – 2004 (and hence
the most desirable approach to practice) [at that time].”269 As a result,
[if] care in 2003–2004 had been scored based on the evidence
available at that time (reflected in the 2005 guidelines), over 40%
of patients would have been judged to be in a different indication
class than if that care had been scored based on the guidelines
available at the time (the 2001 guidelines).270

In view of these persistent problems, it is likely that few current
guidelines, if any, accurately describe the standard of care in a particular
case. The Obama administration’s stimulus money is funding some
comparative effectiveness studies that might provide additional evidence on
which to base guidelines,271 but this evidence is not yet available, and the
methodological problems inherent in the evidence-gathering process make
it far from certain that a substantial amount of suitable evidence will be
produced in the foreseeable future. Efforts by the CMSS and others in the
future may someday overcome the obstructive effects of bias and conflicts
of interest, but again, this may take time, and it is not clear that enough
impartial experts will be left to avoid too great a loss of relevant medical
and scientific expertise in the guideline production process. In short, there
are serious questions about whether practice guidelines can be designed
well enough to serve as indicators of the standard of care.

266. See id. at 29 (citing lack of resources for updating).
267. G. A. Lin et al., Impact of Changes in Clinical Practice Guidelines on Assessment of
Quality of Care, 48 MED. CARE 733, 733 (2010). The guidelines were being evaluated for use in
a pay-for-performance system in which providers are compensated based on whether they
followed best practices, and not in a safe harbors program. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 734.
270. Id. at 735–36.
271. See generally supra notes 185, 205 and accompanying text.
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Assume for the moment, however, that scientifically valid guidelines
produced by disinterested parties do in fact exist, and that a solution
somehow has been found to the problem of how guidelines meant to apply
to population groups, rather than to individuals, can accommodate patient
preferences and medically relevant patient differences without being too
indefinite to be able to serve as conclusive evidence of the standard of care
in malpractice cases. In other words, assume that there are indeed
trustworthy guidelines that actually tell physicians what the standard of care
is in particular cases. Physicians who complied with such guidelines clearly
would be entitled to use them persuasively in their defense.
But how would a court know when it was seeing such a guideline?
Under the current system, the task of ensuring that guidelines accurately
reflect the applicable standard of care is a joint enterprise of both the
judicial and the medical systems. The medical system supplies the
guidelines and the factual and scientific expertise to enable judges to
determine if they are sufficiently reliable to be admissible and, if so, if they
are conclusive enough that the judge can dispense with a jury trial on the
issue of whether or not the defendant met the standard of care. If the judge
decides, based on the input from the medical profession, that the guideline
is not entitled to conclusive weight, then the judge asks the jury to decide
(or decides alone, if the case is being tried without a jury) how much weight
to give evidence, as well as the critical issue of whether the defendant in
fact followed the guideline.
How well does this joint enterprise between law and medicine work?
The only published study to date of cases in which the parties sought to
utilize practice guidelines, an analysis by Hyams, Shapiro, and Brennan in
1996, found twenty-eight cases in which guidelines were “used
successfully” between 1980 and 1994, and cited no cases in which
guidelines had been used improperly.272 My research assistant Kelsey
Marand and I updated this study by examining cases reported between 1995
and 2011. We found a total of twenty-four additional reported cases (listed
in the appendix). Guidelines were used successfully as a defense by
defendants in nine of the cases and by plaintiffs as inculpatory evidence in
eleven. In four cases, the courts determined that guidelines offered by
plaintiffs were not inculpatory. In four cases, guidelines were relied upon by
both parties. In all of the cases in which guidelines were successfully
asserted as inculpatory, the guidelines were deemed “some evidence.” In six
of the cases in which guidelines were successfully used defensively,
adherence to the guideline constituted some evidence; in two, it gave rise to
272. Hyams, Shapiro & Brennan, supra note 5, at 295.
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a rebuttable presumption. These data are admittedly limited, since they only
include reported cases, but they suggest that guidelines serve a useful role
under the current legal regime.
The question, then, is whether a safe harbors approach, in which practice
guidelines would be accepted as conclusive evidence of the applicable
standard of care without first undergoing judicial scrutiny, would work
better. To answer this, we need to know which guidelines would be given
this determinative effect. The medical profession clearly is insisting on
issuing the guidelines.273 Therefore, it will resist the use of guidelines issued
by health insurers, managed care organizations, and malpractice insurers,274
as well guidelines issued by the government, despite arguments that
government involvement either in producing or vetting guidelines is
essential in order for the guidelines to be deemed authoritative.275 But then
273. Nancy H. Nielsen, We Must Protect Guidelines Against Undue Influence,
AMEDNEWS.COM
(Apr.
20,
2009),
http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2009/04/20/
edca0420.htm (“Establishing guidelines for medical practice should be the province of those
most trained to evaluate scientific evidence, which includes medical specialty societies.”); see
Cecil Wilson, Letter to the Editor: Liability and Evidence-Based Standards in Medicine, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/28/opinion/
lweb28malpractice.html (“The good news is that the medical profession is a decade into its
effort to create scientific, physician-level quality measures in a collaborative process based on
best-care practices for patients.”). Wilson is referring to the AMA-convened “Physician
Consortium for Performance Improvement,” which “develops, tests, implements and
disseminates evidence-based measures that reflect the best practice and best interest of
medicine.” Clinical Practice Quality Improvement and Patient Safety, AMERICAN MED. ASS’N,
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/clinical-practice-improvement.page (last
visited Aug. 21, 2012).
274. Scholars generally agree that none of these entities can be trusted to set standards of
care that serve the interests of the public rather than merely those of the issuer. See Avraham,
supra note 195, at 589 (“[H]ospitals, HMOs, and health insurers are too preoccupied with cost
containment to be adequately responsive to patient safety. On the other hand, liability insurers’
main motivations are to prevent liability and lawsuits, so their guidelines are overly cautious
and disregard cost-effectiveness.”); Ayres, supra note 61, at 437 (“[S]ome payers use
parameters, indeed develop them, as a method to maximize profits under the guise of reducing
inefficient or unnecessary services.”); Keyhani et al., supra note 231, at 257 (insurance-sourced
guidelines “are meant to apply only to their beneficiaries and may recommend limiting care
based on cost concerns”). Only Hall seriously suggests that guidelines issued by insurers should
be accepted as the standard of care, arguing that “a sizeable number of patients and physicians
agree to be bound by the standard by choosing to enroll with or work under the particular
insurance plan.” Hall, supra note 105, at 141.
275. See Rosoff, supra note 9, at 329 (proposing government certification program); Albert
Tzeel, Clinical Practice Guidelines and Medical Malpractice: Guidelines Gaining Credibility in
Courtrooms, May Eliminate Expert Testimony (Doctors, Lawyers and Lawsuits), PHYSICIAN
EXECUTIVE, Mar. 2002, at 36, 38 (noting that the use of guidelines in medical malpractice
presupposes approval by state officials). Opponents of government involvement complain that
guidelines issued by government agencies are inherently inefficient (see Avraham, supra note
130, at 635), intrusive (see Cecil B. Wilson, Health System Reform: What Does the Future
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will any guideline issued by medical professionals establish the standard of
care? The AHRQ maintains a database that currently contains more than
2,400 practice guidelines issued by more than 300 organizations,276 most of
Hold, AMERICAN MED. ASS’N. (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/news/
speeches/winter-park-hsr-future.page.), and would be used to ration care (see Rosoff, supra note
9, at 328). Critics point to the firestorm over recommendations for mammograms issued by the
U.S. Preventive Services Task Force and similar incidents as evidence of the high and
potentially unsustainable political costs of government-issued guidelines. See Keyhani et al.,
supra note 231, at 262. Groopman gives the following example of government standard-setting
gone awry: “Medicare specified that it was a ‘best practice’ to tightly control blood sugar levels
in critically ill patients in intensive care. That measure of quality was not only shown to be
wrong but resulted in a higher likelihood of death when compared to measures allowing a more
flexible treatment and higher blood sugar. Similarly, government officials directed that normal
blood sugar levels should be maintained in ambulatory diabetics with cardiovascular disease.
Studies in Canada and the United States showed that this ‘best practice’ was misconceived.
There were more deaths when doctors obeyed this rule than when patients received what the
government had designated as subpar treatment (in which sugar levels were allowed to vary).”
Groopman, supra note 262. Note, however, that the AHRQ described the Obama demonstration
safe harbors project as supporting the development of a ‘safe harbor’ for physicians who can
prove that they followed “state-endorsed evidence-based care guidelines.” AHRQ Press
Release, supra note 203 (emphasis added).
276. News Release, ECRI INSTITUTE (Aug. 4, 2010), https://www.ecri.org/press/pages/
AHRQ_National_Guideline_Clearinghouse_and_National_Quality_Measures_Clearinghouse.as
px. ECRI operates the guidelines clearinghouse for the AHRQ. In an article in the December 14,
2011, issue of JAMA, the American Cancer Society claims that there are nearly 3000 guidelines
in the Clearinghouse. Otis Brawley et al., New American Cancer Society Process for Creating
Trustworthy Cancer Screening Guidelines, 306 JAMA 2495, 2495 (2011). In order to be
included in the clearinghouse, a guideline must meet the following criteria:
1. The clinical practice guideline contains systematically developed
statements that include recommendations, strategies, or information that
assists physicians and/or other health care practitioners and patients to
make decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical
circumstances.
2. The clinical practice guideline was produced under the auspices of
medical specialty associations; relevant professional societies, public or
private organizations, government agencies at the Federal, State, or local
level; or health care organizations or plans. A clinical practice guideline
developed and issued by an individual not officially sponsored or
supported by one of the above types of organizations does not meet the
inclusion criteria for NGC.
3. Corroborating documentation can be produced and verified that a
systematic literature search and review of existing scientific evidence
published in peer reviewed journals was performed during the guideline
development. A guideline is not excluded from NGC if corroborating
documentation can be produced and verified detailing specific gaps in
scientific evidence for some of the guideline’s recommendations.
4. The full text guideline is available upon request in print or electronic
format (for free or for a fee), in the English language. The guideline is
current and the most recent version produced. Documented evidence can
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which are medical groups. Would all of these guidelines create safe
harbors? Would judges have to accept, for example, a guideline issued by
the Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, whose executive
director states that “Comparative Effectiveness Research (CER) won’t buy
anything for you; it will just pay bureaucrats and researchers,” and whose
newsletter describes evidence-based medicine as “a greater merger of state
and corporate power: Mussolini’s definition of fascism”?277
The alternative would be to authorize only some medical groups to issue
legally binding guidelines, as was the case in the Maine guidelines project,
where, it will be recalled, the legislature delegated guideline production to a
handful of state specialty societies.278 But which societies would this be?
Given the proliferation of conflicting recommendations issued by different
groups, selecting only some groups would be tantamount to endorsing one
set of recommendations over the others.279 How would the medical
profession make this choice? The most highly respected source of medical
expertise is probably the IOM,280 yet it is hard to imagine that even the
distinguished members of the IOM could reconcile competing medical
viewpoints, avoid bias and conflicts without losing the necessary expertise,
keep up with changing science, and avoid slowing innovation by not
updating recommendations often enough to accommodate medical
advances.281
More than likely, then, most, if not all, medical groups would want the
right to issue legally binding guidelines, and physicians would want to
insulate themselves from liability by following any one of them. 282 From the
be produced or verified that the guideline was developed, reviewed, or
revised within the last five years.
Inclusion Criteria, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, http://www.ngc.gov/
about/inclusion-criteria.aspx (last visited Aug. 27, 2012).
277. The Standard of Care, AAPS, Vol. 62, No. 1 (Jan. 2006), http://www.aapsonline.org/
newsletters/jan06.php.
278. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
279. Another alternative would be to give guidelines conclusive effect only if they were
endorsed by all medical groups. Not only would such guidelines be rare, but they are likely to
cover practices regarding which the standard of care would not be the subject of dispute
between litigants, and therefore physicians would not have to seek shelter behind them.
280. Cf. Keyhani et al., supra note 231, at 264 (“[A]n independent, nonprofit institute
working with multiple stakeholders—including the public and industry—might be able to
overcome these obstacles.”).
281. See RAND REPORT, supra note 149, at 62 (“legislative mandating of specific guidelines
in any fashion could contribute to the ossification of medical practice by ‘freezing’ the standard
of care—clearly an undesirable eventuality in a field that changes as quickly as medicine”).
282. Safe harbors proponents in fact come close to saying this. Hall argues that “a defense
is sufficiently established if the doctor shows only that she complied with at least one
respectable body of opinion,” see Hall, supra note 105, at 131, while Rosoff states that “[w]hen
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perspective of its historical battles over the standard of care, this approach
represents an intriguing gamble by organized medicine: by embracing
clinical diversity in this fashion, the mainstream profession would lose
much of its control over the standard of care internally, but physicians as a
whole would take control of the standard away from one of their major
external foes—the judicial system.
The medical profession may be willing to play this game, but should we?
A laissez-faire safe harbors program in which essentially any medical body
could issue definitive guidelines would create a race to the bottom in which
fringe medical groups immunize their members from suit by issuing
unorthodox or minimalist recommendations at the expense of patients, 283
and it would give the profession more power over the standard of care than
it has ever enjoyed, and certainly more than any other profession has ever
gained.284 Even in the heyday of medicine’s professional control at the
beginning of the twentieth century, courts still had the responsibility to
determine if the evidence of custom submitted by defendants to establish
two (or more) groups, and thus their guidelines, are of equal stature and authority, a jury could
be instructed that the defendant physician acted acceptably if he or she followed either
guideline.” Rosoff, supra note 9, at 345. But note that neither Hall nor Rosoff would allow any
guideline to be accepted; Rosoff would require government certification, id. at 365–66, and
while Hall does not explain what he means by “respectable,” it is clear that he means for judges
to determine if that term accurately describes the guideline issuer. See Hall, supra note 105, at
141–43.
283. See Havighurst, supra note 130, at 789 (“The medical profession . . . would be
inclined to set relatively permissive standards.”).
284. Most other professions have promulgated the equivalent of practice guidelines, but in
no case are their guidelines accorded automatic admissibility and conclusive legal effect, let
alone one-sided application. The rules governing the conduct of lawyers, in fact, contain explicit
disclaimers against even giving them a presumptive effect. The Model Rules for Professional
Conduct provide that “violation of a Rule should not itself give rise to a cause of action against
a lawyer nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached
. . . . The Rules are designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for
regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil
liability.” MODEL RULES FOR PROF’L CONDUCT, Scope cmt. 20 (2010). The earlier Model Code
of Professional Responsibility similarly stated that “[t]he Model Code makes no attempt to
prescribe either disciplinary procedures or penalties for violation of a Disciplinary Rule, nor
does it undertake to define standards for civil liability of lawyers for professional conduct.”
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (1980) (footnote omitted)
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/mcpr.authcheckda
m.pdf. Ann Peters states that one reason for this position is that “using the ethics rules [in legal
malpractice actions] would be improper because the rules are overly protective of attorneys’
interests, and thus the interests of nonlawyers would be inadequately protected.” Ann Peters,
The Model Rules as a Guide for Legal Malpractice, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 609, 623 (1993).
Peters describes how the D.C. Bar in 1986 sought to delete the disclaimer in the Model Rules,
but “stopped short of accepting ethical rules as a rebuttable presumption of legal malpractice.”
Id. at 616.
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the standard of care was admissible and conclusive, and if the evidence
were deemed admissible but not conclusive, juries still had to decide how
much weight to give it. A safe harbors approach would take all of these
functions away from the courts. What would justify giving the medical
profession such unprecedented power?
VII.

THE LEGITIMACY OF PROFESSIONAL SELF-REGULATION

Medicine is one of the three classic learned professions, the other two
being law and the clergy.285 Scholars generally classify a profession as
“learned” if it satisfies three criteria.286 First, its members must possess
specialized expertise, achieved through a long period of study and
training.287 Robinson, for example, observes that “a strong scientific
foundation and long clinical apprenticeship make medicine esoteric for the
ordinary citizen and create an asymmetry of information and authority
between the physician and the patient.”288 The second criterion for a learned
professional is that it must be committed to acting in the public interest.289
Physician and ethicist Samuel Packer thus explains that “these professions
were elevated from trades over thousands of years, primarily because
society felt that it would be better protected if these professions acted in the
best interests of citizens who were in vulnerable circumstances.”290 These
285. See SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at 35 (“Originally, of course, [professional] referred to
the classic honorific occupations of medicine, the bar, and the clergy.”).
286. See STARR, supra note 16, at 15 (“A profession, sociologists have suggested, is an
occupation that regulates itself through systematic, required training and collegial discipline;
that has a base in technical, specialized knowledge; and that has a service rather than profit
orientation, enshrined in its code of ethics.”); see also SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at 36 (“A
profession is typically described as an occupation characterized by three features: specialized
training in a field of codified knowledge usually acquired by formal education and
apprenticeship, public recognition of a certain autonomy on the part of the community of
practitioners to regulate their own standards of practice, and a commitment to provide service to
the public that goes beyond the economic welfare of the practitioner.”).
287. See ROBINSON, supra note 115, at 16 (stating that specialized expertise is obtained
through a prolonged period of education and training).
288. Id.
289. See SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at 16 (“[A] profession is an occupation based upon
formal knowledge and trained skill, organized in a collegial or guildlike way, and carried on in a
spirit of service.”).
290. Samuel Packer, Embryonic Stem Cells, Intellectual Property, and Patents: Ethical
Concerns, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487, 490 (2008). Descriptions of the professional’s commitment
to the public vary in terms of whether it is a fiduciary obligation to the patient, client, or
parishioner, or instead a dual duty to the patient/client/parishioner and to the public, raising the
question of whose welfare is paramount if the two conflict. Compare id. (“Those in need of
healthcare, legal help, or religious guidance were felt to be vulnerable, and therefore special
privileges were granted to these professions if they would act according to an agreed to social
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two characteristics of the learned profession in turn give rise to the third;
since learned professionals possess specialized expertise and can be trusted
to act in the public interest, they are accorded a degree of self-regulation not
delegated to other occupations:
The specialized skills that distinguish members of a profession
require members of the profession to self-license and to selfregulate. The justification for self-regulation is tied to a distinctive
skill set possessed by members in the profession—only individuals
within the profession have the expertise to evaluate the conduct of
other members. This autonomy is justified by and dependent upon
the profession’s elevation of the public good over its own selfinterest.291

Not surprisingly, the rationales that doctors have special expertise and
that they act in the public interest are the primary justifications offered in
support of the medical profession controlling its standard of care. 292
covenant—that is, a contract. This fiduciary role for physicians, lawyers, and clergy evolved
legally with licensure, codes of ethics, and external and internal mechanisms of compliance.”),
with Melissa H. Weresh, I’ll Start Walking Your Way, You Start Walking Mine: Sociological
Perspectives on Professional Identity Development and Influence of Generational Differences,
61 S.C. L. REV. 337, 340 (2009) (quoting the ABA’s statement: “the client’s trust presupposes
that the practitioner’s self-interest is overbalanced by devotion to serving both the client’s
interest and the public good”). What is clear is that the profession must not regard self-interest
as paramount. Id. Thus, the ABA declares that “fiduciary obligations to elevate the public good
over the self-interest of the individual professional” are one of the “overriding themes that
distinguish members of a profession.” Id.
291. Weresh, supra note 290, at 340–41; see SULLIVAN, supra note 27, at 4, 68 (“Formed
by distinctive occupational cultures, professionals have aspired, as organized bodies, to set
standards and manage the organization of their own work. The markets for professional labor,
as in health care, law, accounting, architecture, or scientific fields, are largely structured by
qualifications the professions themselves have set, even when regulated by the state. . . . [T]he
professional (including a group of professionals providing a certain service) must persuade
clients to accept the professional’s definition and valuation of that service, even as the clients
must acknowledge and trust the competence of the provider.”).
292. See McCoid, supra note 62, at 608 (“The ‘preferred position’ granted by the courts to
the medical profession (and to other professions) may be in recognition of the peculiar nature of
the ‘professional’ activity. The qualified practitioner of medicine has undertaken long years of
study to acquire knowledge of man, his body and its illnesses and the means of combating such
ailments, coupled with an intensive training of the senses and mind of the physician to respond
to stimuli in a manner best described as ‘the healing art.’”); see also Peters, supra note 102, at
968 (“Tort law originally delegated the standard-setting power to physicians because of their
expertise and their trustworthiness.”). Another justification offered to legitimize the standard of
custom in medicine is that it reflects market forces, and therefore produces efficient results. See
Peters, supra note 102, at 954–55 (referring to the views of Richard Posner, Patricia Danzon,
and Richard Epstein). Pearson seems to embrace this view when he defends self-regulation of
the medical profession over judicial oversight: “courts have generally functioned within their
traditional limitations by refusing to become engaged in the establishment of standards of
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Commentators assert that, in contrast to the members of the medical
profession, lay persons do not possess the knowledge and experience to
enable them to evaluate the appropriateness of care.293 Dean Prosser, for
example, predicated the standard of custom on “the healthy respect which
the courts have had for the learning of a fellow profession, and their
reluctance to overburden it with liability based on uneducated judgment.” 294
Furthermore, doctors, it is said, can be trusted to regard the welfare of their
patients as paramount.295 James Henderson, Jr., thus argues that “[a]n
important reason for allowing the medical profession to set its own
standards is that courts can assume these standards are adequate to protect
the interests of patients.”296
The problem the medical profession faces is that neither of these
assumptions presently holds true.297 In the first place, the profession has far
less knowledge and expertise than it claims,298 as shown by the practice
medical practice. If courts were to become so engaged, one likely result would be an increase in
the cost of medical care with no assurance of a parallel increase in quality. Thus, any effort by
courts to supervise the customary methods of medical practice is apt to be self-defeating.”
Pearson, supra note 102, at 956. But see Clark C. Havighurst, Decentralized Decision-Making:
Private Contract versus Professional Norms, in MARKET REFORMS IN HEALTH CARE: CURRENT
ISSUES, NEW DIRECTIONS, STRATEGIC DECISIONS 22 (Jack A. Meyer ed., 1991) (arguing that
custom does not control spending). Peters does a thorough job of demolishing the efficiency
argument, noting the lack of consumer information, comprehension, and choice and physician
conflicts of interest among the reasons for market failures in medicine. Peters, supra note 102,
at 955–58.
293. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 189 (5th ed. 1984), quoted
in Peters, supra note 102, at 951.
294. Id.
295. See Cramm et al., supra note 104, at 703 (“Second, and considerably quainter given
the current organization and delivery of health care, physicians are professionals whose first
priority is dedication to the interests of their patients. From a deterrence standpoint, greater
deference to the judgments of professionals is justified in contrast to others who produce
products or provide services for gain, or even individuals acting in the personal sphere who
pursue their own interests, all of which may pose risks to others.”).
296. James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints in Tort, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 90, 926
(1982), quoted in Peters, supra note 102, at 951. Henderson’s torts casebook co-author Richard
Pearson similarly asserts that “medical custom may be accepted as the standard of care in
medical malpractice cases because physicians have been thought of as not exploiting the market
for medical services for their own gain at the expense of the health of their patients. There is no
need for courts to act as a source of pressure to compel the medical profession to give adequate
consideration to patient safety and well-being, since the forces that operate within the profession
make such extra-professional pressure unnecessary.” Pearson, supra note 102, at 537.
297. It may be questioned whether they ever did.
298. See Philip C. Kissam, Antitrust Law and Professional Behavior, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13
(1983) (Although professional expertise is frequently cited as a rationale for professional selfregulation that is free from government intervention, the scope of professional expertise is often
overstated. For example, the expertise of physicians consists primarily of understanding
scientific laws governing the behavior of the human body. Applying these rules to individual
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variations discovered by Wennberg, discussed earlier.299 Haavi Morreim, for
example, lists a number of mainstream medical practices that lacked
scientific support, including pulmonary artery catheterization, angioplasty,
bypass surgery, arthrosopic debridement of the osteoarthritic knee, hormone
replacement therapy, high-dose chemotherapy with autologous bone
marrow transplantation for breast cancer, and the overuse and underuse of
antibiotics.300 Even when data suggesting the proper course of action exist,
doctors often fail to act on it.301 Brownlee describes how “in one part of the
country, practically every woman with breast cancer was still getting a
mastectomy long after clinical trials had shown that a breast-sparing
lumpectomy with radiation was just as effective. In another, babies were
being put in neonatal intensive care units when they didn’t need it.” 302 A
2006 article in Business Week reports that most of the physicians
interviewed said that only twenty to twenty-five percent of medicine has
been proven effective, and quotes physician and health quality expert David
Eddy as admitting that “[t]he problem is that we don’t know what we are
doing.”303 In 2005, Eddy himself quoted an IOM estimate that “only 15
percent of medical practices [are] based on solid clinical trials . . . .”304
Not only do physicians possess less knowledge than at first blush, but lay
persons seem be able to properly evaluate the quality of medical care, at
least when they are jurors presented with evidence by medical experts.
According to jury authorities Neil Vidmar and Shari Seidman Diamond,
“there is no evidence that juries are incompetent to evaluate expert

circumstances requires varying degrees of judgment, particularly when a physician, in the
absence of scientific knowledge or a known treatment, must respond to a medical problem.
Thus, the expertise of physicians is a mastery of the technical solutions to patients’ problems,
not of the manner in which the physician’s work should be organized. Furthermore,
nonphysicians with less comprehensive and expensive training can competently undertake much
of the physician’s routine work, and scientifically trained non-physicians may be able to
evaluate many or most kinds of medical problems as competently as physicians.”). Richard
Abel makes an additional point: “Professions rest their argument for self-regulation on two
grounds. First, they insist that only fellow professionals possess the necessary expertise to judge
professional performance. Even if true, this is self-serving, since the profession deliberately
constructed the monopoly of expertise in the first place.” ABEL, supra note 2, at 37.
299. See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
300. E. Haavi Morreim, A Dose of Our Own Medicine: Alternative Medicine, Conventional
Medicine, and the Standards of Science, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 222, 223–25 (2003).
301. BROWNLEE, supra note 127, at 34.
302. Id.
303. John Carey, Medical Guesswork, BUSINESS WEEK, May 29, 2006, at 72–79.
304. Eddy, supra note 208, at 10.
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testimony.”305 Moreover, empirical research shows that jurors are not naïve
about experts or easily misled.306
If the premise that physicians are entitled to regulate themselves because
only they have the expertise to evaluate the quality of their care is suspect,
the assumption that they can be trusted to wield their regulatory authority in
the public interest is even less defensible.307 Numerous critics complain, for
example, about the profession’s unwillingness to sanction incompetent
colleagues.308 “[T]he goal of self-regulation often appears to be to protect
the inept members of the profession rather than the society they ostensibly
serve,” observes Abel.309 The legitimacy of the profession began to erode,
305. Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L.
REV. 1121, 1175 (2001). Studies in which expert panels of physicians reviewed jury verdicts in
medical malpractice cases show that they agreed in about seventy percent of the cases, only
slightly lower than the seventy-three percent figure for all cases, whether tried, settled, or
dismissed. See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & DALE A. NANCE, MEDICAL INJUSTICE: THE CASE
AGAINST HEALTH COURTS 40, n.271 (2007), analyzing David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors,
and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 354 N. ENG. J. MED. 2024
(2006).
306. Neil Vidmar, Are Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving
Scientific/Medical Issues? Some Data from Medical Malpractice, 43 EMORY L.J. 885, 902–03
(1994).
307. The deferential portrayal of the professions, which Richard Abel calls “professional
apologetics,” ABEL, supra note 2, at 17, derives from sociologists such as Emile Durkheim and
Talcott Parsons and welfare economists such as Kenneth Arrow who viewed barriers against
entry into the professions not as “the conscious, self-interested strategy of producers, but simply
the means by which society ensures that consumers receive quality services,” id. at 21, and who
felt that the professions “appeared to offer one antidote to the insidious poison of selfish
materialism . . . as altruistic where others were egoistic, [as] self-regulating counterweights to
an increasingly monolithic state.” Id. at 16. This account is rejected by “Chicago school”
economists, who assert that professionals “have the same profit-maximizing interests as people
in other businesses and that professional self-regulation, like any regulatory legislation, is more
likely to result from ‘interest group’ bargaining than from a principled consideration of the
public interest,” Kissam, supra note 298, at 11, and by Weberian sociologists, who hold that
“governing bodies were unrepresentative and ineffective regulators, professions lacked the
expertise they claimed, admission criteria bore little relevance to the profession’s actual work,
ethical rules were motivated by economic self-interest and failed to ensure competence, and
professionals repeatedly betrayed clients.” ABEL, supra note 2, at 17. In his famed study of the
medical profession, Elliot Friedson calls it a “delinquent community” that has failed “to control
the availability, cost, and quality of services of its members in the public interest—a failure tied
directly to the internal laissez faire etiquette of its delinquent community . . . .” ELLIOT
FRIEDSON, DOCTORING TOGETHER: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL CONTROL 246 (1975).
Then there is George Bernard Shaw’s famous quip that “[a]ll professions are conspiracies
against the laity.” GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, DOCTOR’S DILEMMA: A TRAGEDY 28 (Constable
and Co. London 1920).
308. See generally Nadia N. Sawicki, Character, Competence, and the Principles of
Medical Discipline, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 285 & nn.1–7(2010).
309. ABEL, supra note 2, at 38. He cites the fact that, “[a]lthough the number of physician
license revocations increased 59 percent between 1984 and 1985, even the 1985 total was only
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according to Robinson, “under increasingly severe criticism that interpreted
the medical establishment less as a scientifically based benevolent society
and more as a self-interested economic monopoly.”310 Peters calls attention
to recent research demonstrating “that physicians, like the rest of us, are
driven not only by science and fidelity to patient interests, but also by habit,
self-interest, and other competing considerations.”311 Jost decries the fact
that “medical practitioners increasingly view themselves as businessmen
engaging in commerce rather than as professionals and gentlemen.”312 The
reality that the medical profession is self—rather than other—regarding was
powerfully reinforced by Atul Gawande’s 2009 New Yorker article in which
he investigated why care for patients in McAllen, Texas, cost Medicare
twice as much as the national average: this was due to the fact that “a
medical community came to treat patients the way subprime-mortgage
lenders treated home buyers: as profit centers.”313
The realization that medicine is less expert and more self-interested than
it would like to believe is a major reason why the medical profession has
lost a substantial degree of control over the standard of care, as reflected in
the abandonment of the locality and customary care standards.314 If the
medical profession is unable to hold onto the powers that it once exercised
because it can no longer satisfy the conditions that legitimize a substantial
exercise of self-regulation, then it certainly does not seem entitled to the
enormous increase in self-regulatory powers that would result if judges
were no longer permitted to assess the validity of practice guidelines as
evidence of the standard of care.
CONCLUSION
Medical practice guidelines have an important role to play as potential
evidence of the standard of care, and the foregoing analysis does not
preclude them from serving as definitive statements of the standard of care
in malpractice actions. But in order for them to be able to do so, the judicial
system must continue to play a major role. Judges must determine the
admissibility and conclusiveness of guidelines, and they and juries must
406 out of 553,000 physicians; in 33 of the 51 jurisdictions fewer than 5 out of every 1000
physicians suffered any other penalty.” Id.
310. ROBINSON, supra note 115, at 26.
311. Peters, supra note 102, at 953.
312. Jost, supra note 21, at 840.
313. Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum: What a Texas Town Can Teach Us About
Health Care, NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/
2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande?currentPage=all.
314. See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text.
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decide the factual question of whether defendants actually followed the
guidelines behind which they seek to shelter.
If judges and juries in malpractice cases must continue to play these key
roles, then what could be different under a safe harbors approach? At most,
judges might be instructed to give guidelines some degree of presumptive
validity. But if the medical profession does not have the exclusivity of
expertise and devotion to the public interest that would entitle it to validate
guidelines on its own, it certainly cannot justify being given even more
power by preventing plaintiffs from introducing the failure to comply as
evidence of wrongdoing. Nor is it justifiable to prevent plaintiffs from
offering expert evidence to rebut the authoritativeness of guidelines, to
show why the guidelines should not apply in the case in question, or to
question whether the defendants in fact followed them.315 Only if the law
315. Such a distortion of the rules also would raise constitutional concerns. However, the
question of whether a one-way safe harbors approach would be deemed unconstitutional is
complex, and unfortunately the answer is likely to depend as much if not more on the political
views of the judges hearing cases challenging the approach than on the merits. A few things are
fairly clear: a challenge to a state’s one-way-street safe harbors program on the basis of the right
to a jury trial in the Seventh Amendment will not succeed since that amendment has not been
held to apply to the states. Challenges asserted under state constitutional guarantees of the right
to a jury trial and access to the courts may be more successful, since some courts have
invalidated caps on damages on these grounds. See Michelle M. Mello et al., Policy
Experimentation with Administrative Compensation for Medical Injury: Issues under State
Constitutional Law, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 59 (2008); Nancy L. Zisk, The Limitations of
Legislatively Imposed Damages Caps: Proposing a Better Way to Control the Costs of Medical
Malpractice, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 119, 127 (2006). Due process and equal protection
challenges probably would be decided under a rational-basis standard of review. See Mello,
supra note 61, at 705–08. While this standard is highly deferential to legislatures, it does not
give them unlimited freedom, and a one-sided safe harbors law might not meet that standard
unless the reviewing courts are convinced that one-sidedness is necessary in order to induce
physicians to follow guidelines and to reduce defensive medicine. Neither of these arguments
seems persuasive, since physician opposition to guidelines has markedly declined and there is
no logical connection between defensive medicine and allowing both offensive and defensive
use of guidelines. Id. at 695–702. Mello points out that “Permitting the introduction of certain
evidence by one party to a lawsuit but not by the other party is an anomaly in the law. . . . There
are exceptions to the rule of symmetry, but they are few and far between, and each is justified
by an important policy concern. Arguably, no such policy justification exists for the one-way
use of clinical practice guidelines evidence in medical malpractice cases.” Id. at 695 (emphasis
added). None of the safe harbors programs in the 1990s were challenged on constitutional
grounds. See Rosoff, supra note 9, at 343. In the case of Maine, the lack of a challenge may
have been due to the fact that doctors did not take advantage of the program to defend
themselves, and to the perception that it was not as one-sided as might have been thought: “The
legal advisor of the demonstration project’s advisory committee stated . . . that he does not
believe that there will be a successful constitutional challenge to the affirmative defense because
patients still have an absolute right to a jury trial. Furthermore, the plaintiff can rebut the
doctor’s argument in court that the practice guidelines admitted are the applicable standard of
care. For example, if a doctor relies on the Ob/Gyn guidelines and the plaintiff can prove those
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continues to perform its time-tested functions in a fair way can the proper
balance of power between the medical profession and the public interest be
maintained.

are not the appropriate standards for that particular case, then the affirmative defense is not
available. The plaintiff could provide such proof in one of two ways. First, the plaintiff could
prove the case is not an Ob/Gyn case. A second argument would concede that the case is an
Ob/Gyn case, but that the guidelines do not cover the particular treatment or scenario as
presented in the plaintiff's cause of action.” Trail & Allen, supra note 134, at 245.
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APPENDIX
Use of Practice Guidelines in Reported Cases: 1995-2011
Guidelines Used Successfully as Inculpatory
Trowbridge v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Idaho 2010) (birthrelated injury; American College of Obstetrics & Gynecology guidelines).
Van Horn v. Hornbeak, No. CV F 08-1622 LJO DLB, 2010 WL 599885
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2010) (malpractice in prenatal care and delivery; Center
for Disease Control and American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology
guidelines).
Smethers v. Campion, 108 P.3d 946 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005), review denied
(Sep. 27, 2005) (malpractice in LASIK surgery; FDA guidelines).
District of Columbia v. Wilson, 721 A.2d 591 (D.C. 1998) (malpractice in
treating an asthma attack while incarcerated; guidelines included asthma
guidelines issued by U.S. Public Health Service).
Bergman v. Kelsey, 873 N.E.2d 486 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007), appeal denied,
879 N.E.2d 929 (Ill. 2007) (birth-related injury; American College of
Obstetrics and Gynecology and American Academy of Pediatrics
guidelines).
Joyner–Wentland v. Waggoner, 890 N.E.2d 730 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
(malpractice in breast lift; American Cancer Society guidelines).
Campbell v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, Caldwell Parish, 768 So.2d 803 (La.
Ct. App. 2000), rehearing denied (La. Ct. App. 2000), writ denied, 781
So.2d 558 (La. 2001) (malpractice in treating heart attack; source of
guidelines not disclosed).
Collins v. State ex rel. Louisiana Health Care Auth., 774 S.2d 167 (La. Ct.
App. 2000), writ denied, 775 So.2d 439 (La. 2000) (malpractice in treating
infection in emergency room; CDC guidelines).
Feeley v. Baer, 669 N.E.2d 456 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996), review granted, 672
N.E.2d 539 (Mass. 1996), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 679 N.E.2d 180
(Mass. 1997) (allegedly negligent prenatal care leading to death of
newborn; American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology guidelines).
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Darke v. Estate of Isner, 17 Mass. L. Rptr. 689 (Mass. Super. 2004)
(malpractice in gene transfer experiment; American Society of Gene
Therapy and other guidelines).
Jilek v. Stockson, 796 N.W.2d 267 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d sub nom.
Estate of Jilek ex rel. Jilek v. Stockson, 805 N.W.2d 852 (Mich. 2011)
(malpractice in treating chest pain in emergency room; American College of
Emergency Physicians guidelines).
Guidelines Offered Unsuccessfully as Inculpatory
Maynard v. Shook, No. 3:09-1004, 2011 WL 1230067 (S.D. W. Va. Mar.
30, 2011) (malpractice alleged in treating joint pain; American Medical
Association guidelines).
Missan v. Dillon, 819 N.Y.S.2d 211 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (malpractice
alleged in treating prostate cancer; American Brachytherapy Society
guidelines).
Kendall v. Cook, No. E2003-02227-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1626256
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 21, 2004) (malpractice alleged in treating bipolar
disorder; Expert Consensus Guidelines Series).
Thomas v. Alford, 230 S.W.3d 853 (Tex. App. 2007) (malpractice alleged
in cancer treatment; American College of Radiology guidelines).
Guidelines Offered Successfully as Exculpatory
Woods v. U.S., 200 F. App’x 848 (11th Cir. 2006) (malpractice alleged in
hip replacement; American Society of Anesthesiology guidelines).
Cashwell v. U.S., No. 1:CV-09-00728, 2009 WL 2929444 (M.D.Pa. Sept. 8,
2009) (malpractice alleged in treating Hepatitis C; Center for Disease
Control guidelines)
Bond v. U.S., No. 06-1652-JO, 2008 WL 655609 (D. Or. March 10, 2008)
(malpractice alleged in cardiac treatment; American College of
Cardiologists/American Heart Association guidelines).
Becerra v. Contra Costa Cnty., No. A118013, 2008 WL 2546175 (Cal. Ct.
App. June 26, 2008) (birth-related malpractice alleged; American College
of Obstetrics and Gynecology guidelines).
Woldruff v. Banta, No. E038100, 2006 WL 2054344 (Cal. Ct. App. July 25,
2006) (malpractice alleged in cancer treatment; United States Health
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Services Prevention Task Force and American Academy of Family Practice
guidelines; rebuttable presumption).
Estate of Ford v. Eicher, 250 P.3d 262 (Colo. 2011), rehearing denied
(Colo. May 9, 2011) (birth-related malpractice alleged; guideline issuer not
specified).
Ellis v. Eng, 895 N.Y.S.2d 462 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (malpractice alleged
in cancer treatment; American Society of Clinical Oncology guidelines;
rebuttable presumption).
Hinlicky v. Dreyfuss, 848 N.E.2d 1285 (N.Y. 2006) (malpractice alleged in
plaque removal surgery; American Heart Association/American College of
Cardiology guidelines).
Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants, P.C., No. 01-A-01-9702-CV-00069,
1997 WL 536949 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 1997) (malpractice alleged in
treating chest pain; American College of Cardiology/American Heart
Association guidelines).

